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 I. INTRODUCTION 
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured the wearer 
 . . . was that Scarlet Letter, so fantastically embroidered and illuminated 
upon her bosom. It had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the ordinary 
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relations with humanity, and enclosing her in a sphere by herself.  
                                                                                   —Nathaniel Hawthorne1 
 
This Article examines the use of alternative sanctions in international 
law using the exemplar of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.2  It argues that social 
sanctions like shaming have a powerful role to play in enforcing interna-
tional law norms.  When properly deployed, shaming activity by the interna-
tional community can serve to influence the offending state to take correc-
tive action and fill the enforcement gap in international law.  This is the 
lesson from Abu Ghraib.3  There is evidence that the abuses so vividly de-
picted in the now infamous photographs were not an aberration, but had 
occurred for a considerable time despite complaints.4  It took a shaming 
campaign for expressions of regret and corrective action to ensue.5  The 
campaign forced U.S. citizens to come to terms with the fact that their gov-
ernment was acting in violation of internalized international norms (against 
  
 1. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 51 (Bantam Classic ed. 1986). 
 2. There is a rich strain of scholarship that chronicles the abuses at Abu Ghraib and 
discusses their legal implications from a positive law oriented perspective.  See, e.g., Marcy 
Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269 (2005); Charles H. Brower II, 
The Lives of Animals, the Lives of Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1353 (2004).  
 3. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN DIGNITY 
DENIED TORTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 1 (Nov. 3, 2004), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/875c3688-a46d-11dc-bac90158df32ab50/amr511- 
452004en.pdf; see also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relat-
ing to International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 595-96 (2004); Johanna McGeary, The 
Scandal’s Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004, at 26, 32; Tim Reid, Abuse of Prisoners 
‘Widespread’, TIMES (London), May 27, 2004, at 19; Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 11, 2004, at 37, 40. 
 4. The High Commissioner, The Present Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, ¶ 43, 
delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/4 (June 4, 2004); 
Memorandum from Amnesty Int’l, Iraq Memorandum on Concerns Relating to Law and 
Order 1 (July 2003) (on file with author); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT BY THE 
COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION ¶ 27 (Feb. 2004), 
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/Resources/icrc.pdf; Reed Brody, The Road to Abu Ghraib, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH 30 (June 2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf; Eric 
Schmitt, Congress’s Inquiry Into Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners Bogs Down, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
2004, at A8; Terror, Torture and the Political Consequences, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2004, at 
25; Hendrik Hertzberg, Terror and Torture, NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 2003, at 29. 
 5. This kind of action is also seen in the case of the infamous torture memo.  See 
Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed, WASH. POST, 
June 23, 2004, at A1; Adam Liptak, Author of ‘02 Memo on Torture: ‘Gentle’ Soul for a 
Harsh Topic, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A1; R. Jeffrey Smith, Lawyer for State Dept. 
Disputed Detainee Memo, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at A7; Richard W. Stevenson, White 
House Says Prisoner Policy Set Humane Tone, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A1. 
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torture).6  The coincidence of international law norms with internalized do-
mestic norms facilitated expeditious corrective action.7 
Reputations are valued national assets.8  They are built over time and 
are the very currency of international relations, protected almost as jealously 
as territory.9  States attempt to hide10 the true nature and extent of conduct 
violating international norms,11 suggesting that there are behavioral reasons 
  
 6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[Th]e torturer has 
become—like the pirate and the slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy 
of all mankind.”).  The Convention Against Torture, which has been ratified by the United 
States, prohibits states from engaging in acts of torture.  Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
113 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].  The Convention defines torture as “any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person . . . .”  Id. art. 1.  It also prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”  Id. art. 16.  The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War], provides that prisoners of war “must at 
all times be humanely treated” and that “[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form 
of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any 
kind whatever.  Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or 
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” Id. arts. 13, 17. 
 7. See Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 202 n.25 (2004) (“Both U.S. government officials and the Ameri-
can public were deeply embarrassed by the Abu Ghraib prison episode; . . . one could also 
ascribe the shame to indigenous norms against such conduct; . . . Americans were embar-
rassed by the events because they were inconsistent not with international norms but with 
national ones.”). 
 8. Richard B. Bilder, On Being an International Lawyer, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. 
REV. 135, 139 (2006). 
 9. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and 
Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 (2004) (“A nation’s reputation for decency and respect 
for law is a vital national asset that can strongly affect its influence and leadership. . . .  
[D]isclosure of abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere seriously damaged the United States’ 
international standing.”). 
 10. See Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Oth-
ering, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504, 517-18 (2005) (“One relatively crude way of [avoiding 
accountability through the employ of “othering” strategies] . . . is for a state to arrest, detain, 
torture and simply deny the existence of particular detainees altogether. . . . Chile and Argen-
tina in the 1970s, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the Russians in Chechnya . . . are all 
examples of the same basic template of denial.  Keeping ‘ghost detainees’ unregistered, off 
the books and moving them between detention locales or within particular facilities (e.g. at 
Abu Ghraib . . . ) constitutes a fairly unequivocal form of deception involving ‘othering’—
the outright denial of the person’s existence . . . .”). 
 11. See Mark W. Bina, Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability 
After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237, 1252 n.104 (2005) (writing that the U.S. 
sought to disavow the Bybee Memo that stated that conduct, in order to be torture, “‘must be 
of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ 
failure’” and that “‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment’” does not suffice (quoting 
Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President, Regarding the Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
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for their actions, and that disclosure might produce beneficial outcomes.12  It 
is revealing that attempts by international nongovernmental organizations to 
ensure that the international public is informed about violations of interna-
tional norms are frequently met with vociferous objections by the offending 
states and furtive attempts at concealment.13  Tactics such as denials of re-
sponsibility,14 secrecy,15 creation of legal black holes,16 location of question-
able facilities offshore,17 outsourcing of tasks to private actors,18 and sub-
contracting of illegal actions,19 are all indicative of shame experienced by 
  
2340-2340A 46 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf)). 
 12. See Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities 
Markets 35 (Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-34, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID474661_code031202570.pdf?abstractid=
474661&mirid=1 (“Mandatory disclosures generate not only information, but also such 
emotions as perhaps anxiety, embarrassment, euphoria, exuberance, feeling stupid, relief, or 
shame.”). 
 13. Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 
2004, at A1. 
 14. Richard A. Serrano, Pentagon Cites Widespread Involvement in Prison Abuses, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A6 (“From the earliest stages of the prison scandal, top Bush 
administration officials have sought to portray the abuse as the work of a renegade band of 
night-shift MPs.”). 
 15. Editorial, Abu Ghraib, Stonewalled, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A22 (“[T]he 
Bush administration has spent nearly two months obstructing investigations” and has “with-
held crucial government documents . . . .”); Josh White, Army, CIA Agreed on ‘Ghost’ Pris-
oners, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A16 (“Top military intelligence officials at the Abu 
Graib prison came to an agreement with the CIA to hide certain detainees at the facility 
without officially registering them . . . .  Keeping such ‘ghost’ detainees is a violation of 
international law. . . .  Defense Department officials have said that there were as many as 100 
ghost detainees held in prisons in Iraq . . . .”). 
 16. Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 
8 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process 
After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 348-49 (2004).  
 17. David Johnston, Uncertainty About Interrogation Rules Seen as Slowing the 
Hunt for Information on Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A8 (“[T]he C.I.A. decided 
early in the war on terrorism to isolate top-level Qaeda detainees in remote and undisclosed 
locations outside the United States, keeping them far removed from the rules governing the 
American judicial system.”); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends 
Interrogation, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 18. Wilson P. Dizard III, DHS Eyes Outsourcing Intelligence Work, WASH. TECH., 
Oct. 6, 2004, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/24666-
1.html?topic=daily_news.  
 19. Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Ac-
countability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 
(2005); Griff Witte, Contractors Were Poorly Monitored, GAO Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 
2005, at E1; Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between Sol-
diers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A1. 
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the offending state.20  In addition, states or their agents attempt to silence 
whistleblowers and witnesses in order to put a lid on embarrassing revela-
tions.21  If, indeed, there was no sense of shame aroused by disclosure, it is 
hardly likely that states would fear it and go to extreme lengths to conceal 
damaging information.22 
The direct result of concealment is that the international community is 
making decisions without the benefit of crucial information, thus preventing 
the triggering of emotions that might be useful to international law.23  Such 
emotions might motivate relevant actors to react with outrage or anger and 
inflict social sanctions on offending states and their leaders.  Social sanc-
tions in international law can include shaming, withholding of esteem, 
shunning, expulsion from group membership, negative voting by other 
states in international organizations, and resolutions by political groups in 
domestic legislatures24—all of which have the potential to influence leaders 
and states in positive ways.25  The determined efforts to keep violations se-
cret suggests that concealment is aimed at preventing the levying of these 
social sanctions and that sunshine alone might serve as a powerful sanction.  
If shaming is a possibility, disclosure becomes even more potent, and ra-
tional actors who desire to avoid being shamed will act in conformity with 
  
 20. Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 10, at 520 (writing that the U.S. strategy of 
othering is done “with a brash lack of concern about admitting it”). 
 21. Neil A. Lewis, F.B.I. Memos Criticized Practices at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2004, at A19. 
 22. Deborah Horan, Ex-UN Envoy: U.S. Feared Discovery of Prison Abuse, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 29, 2005, § 1, at 6. 
 23. Behavioral economics research shows that emotions motivate people to punish 
opportunistic conduct.  Studies show that subjects in experiments are more likely to inflict 
punishment when they are angry.  See Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, Emotional 
Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment, 112 ECON. J. 147, 154-55 (2002).  There is also a 
demonstrable correlation between the degree of anger and the willingness to incur costs in 
order to punish offenders.  Dominique. J.-F. de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic 
Punishment, 305 SCI. 1254 (2004). 
 24. Norimitsu Onishi, Asked for Apology, Japan Plays for Time in Sex Slavery 
Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com- 
/2007/06/27/world/asia/27japan.html; US Senate Wants Philippines to Improve Human 
Rights Before Approving Aid: Philippine Official, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/05/asia/AS-GEN-Philippines-US-HumanRights.php. 
 25. Studies also show that the ability to express punishment has important implica-
tions for cooperative behavior.  Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of 
Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment 19 (Tinbergen Inst. Discussion Paper 
No. 2005-075/1, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=775524 (“[I]ndividuals who are 
willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating . . . .  This guaranties that, as long as 
these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. . . . [T]he 
same type of people is necessary to support punishment in the presence of retaliation.  If 
retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel 
. . . .”). 
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the norm.26  If conformity with the norm is not possible, and a shame sanc-
tion has been imposed, the offender is likely to try to lessen the blow by 
being cooperative and expressing remorse.27  Shaming is also likely to result 
in norm-internalization and acceptance of the sanction, resulting in the of-
fenders becoming “good types” in the future.  Norm-internalization in this 
context is not limited to the offending state—non-offending observer states 
realize the disutility of violation and embrace the norm, or at least conform 
to it despite being previously disposed to violate it.  There is some evidence 
of certain kinds of violations declining in the aftermath of shaming-like 
activity, leading to optimism that the model proposed here could be prefer-
able to other types of sanctions.28 
Hiding important information also hinders vital oversight over states 
and leaders falling short of their international obligations.  If these actors are 
indeed motivated by shame and embarrassment, international institutions 
might benefit from intervention aimed at taking advantage of such emo-
tions.29  This reduces the need for crafting expensive legal sanctions if social 
sanctions can achieve similar results.30  International law sanctions are not 
  
 26. A study of “sin” stocks found that “there is a societal norm against funding 
operations that promote human vice and that some investors, particularly institutions subject 
to public scrutiny and social norms, pay a financial price for not holding these stocks.”  Har-
rison Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets 
32 (Sauder Sch. of Bus. Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=766465. 
 27. New Zealand Apologises to Samoa, BBC NEWS, June 4, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2024214.stm.  Prime Minister Helen Clark is 
quoted as saying, “[o]n behalf of the New Zealand government, I wish to offer today a for-
mal apology to the people of Samoa for the injustices arising from New Zealand’s admini-
stration of Samoa in its earlier years, and to express sorrow and regret for those injustices[.]”  
Id.; see also Japan PM Apology on Sex Slaves, BBC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6495115.stm. 
 28. Liz Fuller, Chechnya: Rights Situation May Be Improving, RADIO FREE EUROPE, 
June 21, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/1b705109-2463-46be-b400-
c5955272513a.html; Indonesia Improving on Human Rights, but Stronger Steps Needed—
UN Expert, UN NEWS CENTRE, June 12, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/ne- 
ws/story.asp?NewsID=22883&Cr=indonesia&Cr1. 
 29. One example of this is the furor generated by top United Nations official Jan 
Egeland calling rich nations “stingy.”  Colum Lynch, U.N. Report Urges Rich to Give More, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2005, at A13.  Despite its protests, following the labeling, the United 
States doubled its aid package.  Caroline Overington, US Rejects Stingy Tag, and Praises 
Australia, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/Asia-Tsunami/US-rejects-stingy-tag-and-praisesAustralia/200- 
4/12/29/1103996616123.html. 
 30. Abigail Barr’s study in Zimbabwe shows that shame-based sanctions could work 
just as effectively as fines.  Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: 
Experimental Results from Rural Zimbabwe 4 (Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, 
Working Paper No. 149, 2001), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpa-
pers/pdfs/2001-11text.pdf.  She writes that “[i]ndividuals who feel external shame respond to 
anticipated shame-based sanctions just as they respond to anticipated pecuniary sanctions; 
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easy to impose even where they exist.31  By tapping into social sanctions 
that already exist, and leveraging their power to lower agency costs,32 inter-
national law can play a salutary role without being heavy-handed and distor-
tive.33  This Article argues that emotions like shame and guilt have a role to 
play in influencing state behavior, and that the scholarship on international 
law can draw on insights from psychology and behavioral economics to 
advance our understanding of the pathways for influencing state conduct.34  
It helps to advance the scholarship beyond the hackneyed arguments about 
compliance and sanctions that are routinely bandied about, often based 
purely upon rational choice35 models that are severely stunted.36  It also of-
fers a different approach to enhancing cooperative behavior by states. 
This approach sheds light on the role of shame and embarrassment in 
enforcing international norms.37  Clear and credible information that dis-
closes the facts pertaining to a violation will help norms entrepreneurs to 
deploy social sanctions like shame in order to ensure compliance with inter-
  
they choose a level of cooperation that equates the marginal expected loss in utility due to 
feeling external shame with the marginal loss in utility due to cooperating.”  Id. 
 31. Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995), available at 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No4/art2.pdf (“In the body of general law and practice 
concerning enforcement of international rules the principle of self-help remains prominent.”). 
 32. Agents are primarily employed in order to make up for the gaps in information, 
knowledge, skill, and time that prevent principals from accomplishing the tasks that are 
delegated to their agents on their own.  It is these very advantages enjoyed by agents that 
create problems of “adverse selection” and “moral hazard.”  To be sure, these problems are 
addressed by the various incentive and monitoring structures that are created by principals—
by limiting discretion, tying incentives to the principal’s returns, careful selection of the 
agent, etc., principals try to ensure that they remain the masters of the relationship.  In our 
case, the principals are the citizens, and agents are the rulers.  Despite this, the rulers are 
more powerful, primarily because of real barriers to removal caused by collective action 
problems, and the constitutional structure. 
 33. Robert Carswell, The Need for Planning and Coordination of Economic Sanc-
tions, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 857, 857-58 (1987) (“financial or trade sanctions have 
often proved not only ineffective in achieving an ascertainable objective, but have also 
proven to be very expensive . . . .”). 
 34. Huang, supra note 12, at 14 (“Many of the cognitive psychological insights of 
behavioral finance were already an accepted part of the folk-wisdom that formed the basis 
and rationale for our federal system of securities regulation.”). 
 35. Social sanctions like shame and ostracism might not work under the assumption 
of selfish utility maximization unless the offender values what other people think about him, 
because if he does not, no loss in utility is experienced. 
 36. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (attacking the limitations of preferences in 
explaining conduct that shows that individuals do not always make personal welfare maxi-
mizing choices).   
 37. That social norms can play an important role in promoting cooperative behavior 
is well documented.  See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in 
Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000). 
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national norms.  It will allow other states, international organizations, and 
the public to determine if a state’s action is violative of international law 
norms, and if so, it will allow them to participate in sanctioning states and 
their leaders.38  Clarity in disclosure also facilitates the creation of a norm 
requiring other states to engage in sanctioning behavior.  The creation of 
such a norm will minimize the free-rider problem by imposing costs on par-
ties who choose not to pay the costs associated with enforcing the primary 
norm.  States that do not sanction offending states and their leaders by 
shaming and/or expulsion from international institutions of which they are 
members, might themselves become targets of shaming activity by other 
states and the broader international community. 
The enormous expense and inefficiency of international legal sanc-
tions should prompt states and scholars to seriously examine the role of 
alternative social sanctions like shaming.39  While there has been attention 
devoted to shaming in other areas of the law, most particularly the criminal 
law,40 international law scholars have only tended to discuss shaming in 
passing.41  Given the financial and institutional costs imposed by legal sanc-
tions, and the hostility of the international community towards bearing those 
costs, shaming is particularly attractive due to its low cost and decentralized 
enforcement potential.42  The fact that much of the law on state conduct in 
international law is morally driven should have occasioned a greater focus 
on shaming sanctions by international law scholars, because at their very 
  
 38. Clare Dyer, Blair’s Guantánamo ‘shame’—ex-law lord, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 
12, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1751830,00.html (quot-
ing Lord Steyn as saying: “You may ask: how will it help in regard to the continuing outrage 
at Guantánamo Bay for our government now to condemn it?  The answer is that it would at 
last be a powerful signal to the world that Britain supports the international rule of law”). 
 39. See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Re-
sponses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine 
Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 561, 566 (2003). 
 40. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 
(1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]; Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming 
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 
J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? 
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
2157 (2001); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880 (1991) [hereinafter Massaro, American Criminal Law]; James Q. Whitman, What 
is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE  L.J. 1055 (1998).  For a brilliant piece 
on the role of shame in corporate law, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). 
 41. See Therese O’Donnell, Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security 
Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945 (2006); Adam Liptak, Mideast 
Turmoil: Geneva Conventions; When Letter of the Law Does Not Spell ‘Clarity’, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2002, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htm- 
l?res=9900E7DE1431F932A35756C0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
 42. Wexler, supra note 39, at 564 (pointing out that “[o]ne advantage of shaming 
penalties, as compared to incarceration, is their cheapness”). 
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core, they are forms of moral disapprobation.  The relative shortage of 
analysis of shaming in the international law area is all the more curious 
given the increased use of rhetoric that invokes shaming-like language and 
tactics by participants, mostly international institutions and nongovernmen-
tal organizations.43  Such rhetoric has also increasingly been deployed by 
norms entrepreneurs like Amnesty International, and the work of these ac-
tors is key to the application of social sanctions. 
Shaming, as it is used in this Article, refers to a deliberate attempt to 
negatively impact a state or leader’s reputation by publicizing and targeting 
violations of international law norms.44  This should be distinguished from 
unintentional reputational damage that might be sustained by mere fact re-
portage by the news media or other agencies.45  While this definition seems 
to be accepted by many legal scholars, some do not characterize these kinds 
of sanctions as shaming, requiring an internal element in addition to exter-
nal enforcement.46  This internal element, “moral shame,” refers “to a colli-
sion between one’s actual self—past or present—and one’s internalized and 
moral ego ideal.”47  This Article prefers to adopt a definition of shame that 
includes both facets.  The actions of outsiders are aimed at instilling shame 
and can be characterized as shame’s external element.  One’s own feelings 
of shame, either in response to the actions of others, or because of one’s 
own conception of having fallen short of an ideal, can be characterized as its 
  
 43. Dyer, supra note 38 (quoting Lord Steyn as saying: “Unfortunately, our prime 
minister is not prepared to go further than to say that Guantánamo Bay is an understandable 
anomaly.  In its feebleness this response to a flagrant breach of the rule of law, reminiscent 
of the worst actions of totalitarian states, is shaming for our country”). 
 44. See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 609, 610 (2006) (“[M]ost scholars agree that shaming punishments involve the deliber-
ate public humiliation of the offender.”).  It is also to be distinguished from guilt.  According 
to some scholars, “shame is related to a devaluation of the self, and therefore the action ten-
dency of shame is withdrawal and avoidance of further contact.  On the other hand, guilt is 
more related to the blameworthiness of an act and is thus more likely to result in reparation 
and action.”  Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 25, at 21.  Psychologist Donald L. Nathanson 
writes that “guilt is the painful emotion triggered when we become aware that we have acted 
in a way to bring harm to another person or to violate some important code.”  DONALD L. 
NATHANSON, SHAME AND PRIDE: AFFECT, SEX, AND THE BIRTH OF THE SELF 19 (1994). 
 45.   E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099-1100 (3rd Cir. 1997) (“Public shaming, 
humiliation and banishment all involve more than the dissemination of information. . . .  
[T]hese colonial practices inflicted punishment because they either physically held the per-
son up before his or her fellow citizens for shaming or physically removed him or her from 
the community.”); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1217 (D.N.J. 1996) (“The shaming 
punishments of colonial times were intended to and did visit society’s wrath directly upon 
the offender . . . .”). 
 46. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like Retribution, 18 
LAW & PHIL. 327, 337-38 (1999) (“[T]hese punishments (e.g., requiring prisoners to work on 
chain gangs or wear pink underwear . . .) have little or nothing to do with moral shame but     
. . . [are] coercive exercises in humiliation and degradation . . . .”). 
 47. Id. at 338. 
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internal element.  While shaming activity is perfectly possible without the 
internal dimension being present, in order for it to be successful, both ele-
ments must be present. 
Shaming in the international law arena is aimed at achieving the fol-
lowing outcomes—labeling a state as an offender, creating a reputation as a 
bad actor and non-cooperator, expulsion from international organizations,48 
causing economic harm, shunning by other states and commercial entities, 
and mobilizing domestic public opinion against the offending regime or 
leader.  Shame sanctions are most effective in tightly-knit societies with 
shared norms.49  Such ideal conditions are unlikely to exist for the deploy-
ment of shame sanctions in international law.  However, there are epistemic, 
religious, ethnic, gender, class, and language bonds that transcend national 
borders presenting conditions favorable for shaming to work in international 
law.50   
Despite the differences in religion, ethnicity, education, goals, political 
affiliations, race, and gender, all participants in the international law system 
share, at a minimum, an opprobrium for torture,51 slavery,52 piracy,53 geno-
cide,54 prostitution,55 and narcotic drugs,56 as reflected by international law 
instruments in these areas.  Yet, these norms are violated by states, and legal 
  
 48. See Katherine Butler, Pakistan Told to Reform or Face Isolation, THE INDEP., 
Oct. 19, 1999, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article287802.ece; 
Richard Dowden, Blair Fails to Reach Commonwealth Agreement on Zimbabwe Exclusion, 
THE INDEP., Dec. 6, 2003, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/arti-
cle81411.ece. 
 49. Skeel, Jr., supra note 40. 
 50. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining an epistemic community as a “network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an au-
thoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”). 
 51. Convention Against Torture, supra note 6.   
 52. See Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 
Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 
7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 53. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 
82. 
 54. See Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948). 
 55. See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploi-
tation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. 
 56. See Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (Vienna), Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988); Protocol Amending the Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs (New York), 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 804 (1972); Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances (Vienna), Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543; Convention Relat-
ing to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 
8 L.N.T.S. 187. 
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sanctions, even where they exist, have proved to be inadequate.  Can shame 
sanctions do better?  Intuitively, the lower cost, decentralization of en-
forcement, and value placed in reputation suggests that shaming should be 
effective.  Evidence from the Abu Ghraib case will be considered to under-
stand the extent to which shaming constrains state behavior, and the ways in 
which it can be used as a sanction to enforce international law norms.  
States are not isolated entities—they are members of international in-
stitutions, clubs, and other organizations.  Interdependence and networking 
are indeed the very currency of state action on the international level.  It is 
this enmeshment in groups that presents conditions ripe for the deployment 
of shame sanctions.  Group membership invites scrutiny and makes reputa-
tion matter. At a minimum, bad behavior invites questions and subjects the 
state to embarrassment.  Even if the leader or state is shameless, the very 
process of shaming has the effect of establishing and cementing the asserted 
norm—not a trivial function because it informs potential offenders that bad 
conduct invites shaming.57  Thus, as long as reputation is not completely 
irrelevant, shame matters.58   
It is difficult to see how leaders and states can be callous about their 
reputations.  Indeed, reputations are most important to such actors.59  They 
have to win elections, protect their positions, make business deals, and ad-
vance interests—all of which are founded on the possession of a good repu-
tation.  As is readily apparent, the stakes are much higher for these actors 
than they are for the average offender, and shame, at least theoretically, 
must have a constraining effect on reputation-conscious actors if they wish 
to be repeat players.60  This might explain the hand wringing that goes on 
  
 57. See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 40, at 639.  Professor Kahan ar-
gues that shaming has the effect of shaping preferences.  If individuals are shamed for con-
travening a particular asserted norm, other observers will modify their own behavior to fit 
that asserted norm. 
 58. Professor Kahan’s widely reported recantation of his earlier views on shaming 
expressly rejects the argument that shaming is inappropriate because some offenders are 
shameless.  Instead, he seems to be basing his recantation on the idea that shaming is parti-
san.  See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
2075, 2076 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan, Shaming Sanctions] (“What’s really wrong with 
shaming penalties . . . is that they are deeply partisan: when society picks them, it picks sides, 
aligning itself with those who subscribe to norms that give pride of place to community and 
social differentiation rather than to individuality and equality.”). 
 59. Scott Wolford, The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International 
Conflict, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 772-88 (2007); Alexandra Guisinger & Alastair Smith, Honest 
Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises, 46 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 175 (2002). 
 60. Jordan Sentences Former Lawmaker to Prison for Harming State’s Reputation, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/20- 
07/10/09/africa/ME-GEN-Jordan-Lawmaker.php (writing about the conviction of “Ahmad 
Oweidi al-Abbadi, the head of a small right-wing party called the Jordanian National Move-
ment, . . . for . . . sending an e-mail to U.S. Senate majority leader Harry Reid, . . . in which 
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within the ruling group in a state when egregious violations of international 
law norms are highlighted in the media.61  The fear of tarnishment can ex-
tend to observers—it has been suggested that high profile cases like that of 
General Pinochet make dictators more afraid and, hence, more cautious, 
even if liability did not result in that instance.62 
Why are powerful actors so afraid?  The reason is simple: the primary 
motivation for these actors is esteem.  This is supported by the large number 
of people who covet high political office despite the relatively low compen-
sation for prime ministers and presidents63 when the risks of office are dis-
proportionately high.64  If financial gain is not the primary motivation (al-
though it can be a motivation) for political office, it is possible that consid-
erations of prestige and social esteem have major roles to play as motiva-
tional factors for people to covet these appointments.  This suggests that 
sanctions like shame can be powerful constraints because they strike at the 
very root of the motivation for these individuals to want the good (political 
office).  If the risk of being shamed is high, these individuals might be con-
strained to conform to international law norms.  To be sure, this constraint 
  
he decried an allegedly steep increase in corruption among top Jordanian officials.”  He was 
convicted for “harming the government’s reputation and sentenced . . . to two years in 
prison”). 
 61. Racism Alive and Well:  After Attack on Indians, Germany Fears For its Reputa-
tion, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.spiegel.de/intern- 
ational/germany/0,1518,501352,00.html (quoting Wolfgang Thierse, Social Democrat Vice 
President of the Bundestag Lower House of Parliament, as saying: “The worse Germany’s 
reputation becomes, the fewer people who we need for our progress and prosperity will come 
here”).  
 62. Reed Brody, One Year Later, The ‘Pinochet Precedent’ Puts Tyrants on Notice, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/10/14/global12796.htm 
(“Pinochet’s arrest awakened the hopes of victims around the world, many of whom are now 
exploring how to use foreign courts to bring their tormentors to justice.”); Steve Boggan, 
Kissinger Begins to Stoop Under the Weight of Legal Scrutiny, THE INDEP., Apr. 25, 2002, 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/kissinger-begins-to-stoop-
under--the-weight-of-legal-scrutiny-658118.html (“To imagine Dr[.] Kissinger being ar-
rested was impossible, but such a move had seemed just as unlikely in 1998 with General 
Pinochet.”). 
 63. World Leader Salary Comparison, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 9, 2007, available 
at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/09/asia/singbox.php; Bolivia Leader Halves His Own 
Pay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4652940.stm; Ben Hall, 
Sarkozy’s Salary Will Double to Match Peers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, available at 
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?ct=0&amp;amp;id=071030000664 (“By international and 
domestic comparisons, the French president is poorly paid.”); Ahern Defends ‘Modest’ Pay 
Increase, BREAKING NEWS, Nov. 11, 2007, available at  http://www.breaking news.ie/ire- 
land/mhmhgbeysnau/rss2/ (quoting Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahearn as saying: “It would 
not be hard for a member of the media to write a glowing article about how poverty-stricken 
we are compared to other countries”). 
 64. In the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, for example, there were almost a dozen 
candidates in the early stages.   
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comes into conflict with the urge for self-preservation—since it is the state’s 
population that ultimately determines if a person can rule or stay in power, 
actions that bring the individual into conflict with popular opinion will be 
avoided unless there are powerful incentives for engaging in them.  Sham-
ing might provide such an incentive.65  In the corporate law context, Profes-
sor Bebchuk refers to “outrage costs” that directors have to bear when ex-
cessive compensation agreements are revealed.66  Although he does not ex-
pressly refer to it, shaming appears to be at work here.  Similarly, when 
outrage is expressed at a violation of an international law norm, it is inevi-
table that some, if not all, leaders will be shamed, either in the internal or 
external dimension.  Faced with this choice, the leader is caught between 
(the clichéd) Scylla and Charybdis—if he ignores the deleterious effects of 
breaching the norm for the state and proceeds to do so, he runs the risk of 
being subjected to a shaming sanction at the international level.  If, on the 
other hand, he retreats from the offending action, the prospect of being tar-
geted by opposing political actors for cowardice is real.  This might not be 
ideal for individual leaders, but it might be good for the international com-
munity as it makes them more cautious about violating international law. 
This Article will attempt to explore linkages between shaming sanc-
tions and the violation of international law norms in the Abu Ghraib case.  
Part II provides a brief sketch of the scholarly treatment of shame sanctions 
in some areas of the law and their role in strengthening social norms.  In 
Part III, this Article elaborates on the relationship between norms and the 
law and addresses the costs of enforcing social sanctions.  It draws on in-
sights from behavioral economics and examines relevant experimental evi-
dence.  Part IV focuses on the deployment of shaming in targeting the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib.  Part V presents some tentative general conclusions 
on the role of alternative sanctions in international law and tries to craft a 
basic architecture for the deployment of these sanctions.  In doing the 
above, this Article seeks to make a contribution in moving the state of the 
scholarship beyond passing mentions of the role of social norms and shame 
sanctions in international law, to providing a clear conceptual framework 
which identifies the relevant target for the deployment of the shame sanc-
tion; the enforcers of the sanction; and the limitations of the sanction as it is 
  
 65. Australian Lawmaker Says Military to Monitor Japan’s Whalers if Opposition 
Wins Government, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/arti- 
cles/ap/2007/11/15/asia/AS-GEN-Australia-Japan-Whaling.php; China, India Expected to 
Stick with Coal Despite Calls to Reduce Carbon Emissions, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 14, 
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/14/business/EU-GEN-Energy-
Congress-Coal.php. 
 66. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5 (2004) (“The more outrage a com-
pensation arrangement is expected to generate, the more reluctant directors will be to ap-
prove it and the more hesitant managers will be to propose it in the first place.”). 
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deployed by the enforcers against the target.  By doing the above, the Arti-
cle opens up new areas for the study of the ways in which social sanctions 
can help to sanction offenders and promote the observance of international 
law norms. 
II. SHAME: A BRIEF EXCURSUS 
The role of shame sanctions in constraining human behavior has been 
debated fiercely by criminal law scholars.  The dominant view is that sham-
ing is “the process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw 
attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of pun-
ishing him for having those dispositions or engaging in those actions.”67  
This has manifested itself in a variety of ways—publication of the names of 
patrons of prostitutes in newspapers,68 and special license plates for people 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs being two ex-
amples.69  Several courts have employed shaming sanctions as part of the 
sentencing process.70  Shame sanctions allow negative emotions aroused by 
  
 67. Kahan & Posner, supra note 40, at 368.  Dan Markel writes that shaming is 
“marked by two features: first, there is an attempt to debase, degrade, or humiliate the of-
fender; and second, the degradation occurs before the public eye, often but not always with 
the aid of the public.”  Markel, supra note 40, at 2178. 
 68. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 735 n.12 (1998); Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, 
Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prosti-
tutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (1996). 
 69. Donna DiGiovanni, Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 
22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 644 (1988). 
 70. Some reported cases where shaming has been employed are: United States v. 
Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring a convict to wear a signboard pro-
claiming his guilt); United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring the 
defendant to publish notice in the official journal of the parish); United States v. Schechter, 
13 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring the defendant to notify all future employers of 
the defendant’s past tax offenses); People v. Letterlough, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994) (“CONVICTED DWI” sign on license plate); People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (tap shoes for purse thief who used tennis shoes to approach his victims 
quietly and flee swiftly); Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986) (requiring a defendant to place a sticker on his automobile: “CONVICTED D.U.I.—
RESTRICTED LICENSE”); Ballenger v. Georgia, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) 
(imposing a condition requiring the offender to wear a fluorescent pink plastic bracelet im-
printed with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT”).  Contra People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
681, 686-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring a shoplifting offender to wear a t-shirt whenever 
he left the house reading: “My record plus two six-packs equals four years” on the front and 
“I am on felony probation for theft” on the back. This was struck down on appeal on the 
ground that the objective was to “public[ly] ridicule and humiliate[e]” and not “to foster 
rehabilitation”); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (requiring a 
DWI offender to publish a newspaper advertisement with an apology and a mug shot. This 
was struck down because it “possibly, adds public ridicule as a condition” and was contrary 
to the goal of rehabilitation). 
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the offender to be ventilated.71  Often the enforcer of the shaming sanction 
expresses the collective emotion, by acting with outrage and disapproval on 
behalf of the group.72  It is not necessary that prior approval be obtained by 
the enforcer before embarking on this action.73  The enforcer is taking a 
chance that his conduct accords with the general consensus.  Such presump-
tive action, apart from sanctioning conduct that is wrong, is designed to 
serve a signaling function by cautioning bystanders to the possibility of 
shaming if they commit similar acts.  Shame sanctions are aimed at deter-
rence.74 It is possible for the sanction to over-deter—individuals who are 
excessively cautious might be deterred from good conduct, for fear of of-
fending aggressive enforcers. 
Before his recent recantation,75 the doyen exponent of shame sanctions 
in the criminal law was Professor Dan Kahan.  Kahan’s views on shaming 
flow from his belief that criminal law must be expressive of disapproval if it 
is to be effective.76  He argued that shame had the ability to express this 
disapproval better than incarceration, and was, therefore, preferable.77  Ac-
cording to him, the damage to reputation serves as both the deterrent and 
retributive objectives of the criminal law.78  Shame is more attractive than 
incarceration because it does not entail bureaucratic expenditure.79  The task 
of enforcement is delegated to the community, and the state does not have 
to expend money on carrying out the sanction.80  Shame is also advanta-
geous when deployed in conjunction with penalties and fines, which may 
  
 71. Skeel, Jr., supra note 40, at 1814-16. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 
F.3d 1077, 1120-21 (3rd Cir. 1997) (“[N]otification results in shaming the offender, thereby 
effecting some amount of retribution.  This suffering ‘serves as a threat of negative repercus-
sions [thereby] discourag[ing] people from engaging in certain behavior.’  It is, therefore, 
also a deterrent.  There is no disputing this deterrent signal; the notification provisions are 
triggered by behavior that is already a crime, suggesting that those who consider engaging in 
such behavior should beware.” (citation omitted)). 
 75. Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 58, at 2075.  The recantation appears to 
be based on his belief that shaming was partisan and that incarceration is preferable to sham-
ing because it is expressively overdetermined.  Professor Kahan explains that a “law or pol-
icy can be said to be expressively overdetermined when it bears meanings sufficiently rich in 
nature and large in number to enable diverse cultural groups to find simultaneously affirma-
tion of their values within it.”  Id. at 2085. 
 76. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 40. 
 77. Id.  See also Flanders, supra note 44, at 612 (“Compared to imprisonment, 
shaming punishments inflict much less physical cruelty.  Indeed, they replace damage to 
one’s physical integrity with mere damage to one’s status or reputation.”). 
 78. Flanders, supra note 44, at 612; see also Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra 
note 40, at 630. 
 79. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 40, at 372. 
 80. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 40, at 630-49. 
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not be effective if the offender has significant economic resources.81  Repu-
tation is perhaps most significant for such offenders, and when combined, 
the fine and the shame sanction can be an extremely powerful cocktail. 
Shaming meshes neatly with the debate on the bindingness of interna-
tional law because it resolves some of the deficiencies of legal sanctions 
when the subjects are states.  Legal sanctions are crude in their applica-
tion—imprisonment and financial penalties do not always correlate with the 
actions of the offender.  This is particularly the case when one is dealing 
with state action—several levels of omission and commission are involved 
and attributing responsibility to individuals at a degree sufficient to justify 
incarceration or fines might prove difficult in many cases.  Even where this 
is possible, individuals who are held guilty are probably low in the hierar-
chy because the potential for provable violations is greater when those 
charged with executing imprecise commands and objectives of those higher 
up the chain are involved.  Thus, while it is possible to jail the soldier or 
policeman, those higher up the ladder are harder to prosecute, undermining 
the objective of the sanction.  Further, for most indirect non-dangerous of-
fenses, all that the international community wants is that outrage be ex-
pressed at the offending state in order to coerce it to modify its behavior, 
rather than to see individual state actors go to jail or to make them pay fines.  
Addressing this concern has to be part of international law’s expressive di-
mension.  In the case of violations such as those at Abu Ghraib, one is not 
trying to get the state, which has disregarded an international law norm, or 
the citizenry, which does not curtail the actions of the government, punished 
with the tools conventionally used to mete out legal punishment.  The inter-
national law community recognizes that while the individual perpetrators 
can be punished by jail time, it is the state’s creation of conducive circum-
stances for the offenders that is the real mischief—a situation not amenable 
to traditional legal sanctions.  Further, financial penalties are crude matches 
for the actions of the state, and even where they are feasible might have 
little teeth if the state possesses enormous financial resources.  If, indeed, 
the fine packs significant economic punch, the state might justify it on na-
tionalistic grounds and might characterize it as a defense expenditure, for 
example, effectively removing the stigma out of the sanction.  Legal sanc-
tions, then, become inappropriate tools for what international society really 
wants to do.  Any sanction, if it has to be meaningful and reflective of a 
sophisticated system, must match the message that society is trying to con-
vey to the offender, and be proportional to the offense.82  Social sanctions 
  
 81. Id.  This problem persists in most areas where fines are the punishment.  For 
example, a fine would have been a rather weak sanction when applied to Martha Stewart 
because of her vast financial resources, whereas shaming can strike at a commodity that 
might not be so easily replaceable—reputation. 
 82. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 40. 
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like shaming are more appropriate sanctions because they serve the expres-
sive function of the law insofar as they tell the offending state that it has 
acted in a way that meets with society’s disapproval.  It leaves other conse-
quences to individual states to administer. 
A.  Problems with Shame Sanctions 
If shame sanctions are effective and less costly than legal sanctions, 
why have they been met with resistance?  Several scholars have attacked 
shaming on the ground that it has debilitating negative effects.83  One such 
effect is the possibility for those shamed to form subcommunities of offend-
ers who explicitly embrace their wrongs and defy the majority.84  The so 
called “axis of evil” might be one example of such a phenomenon in the 
international arena.85  These subcommunities make it a virtue to engage in 
criminal activity, and shaming will have no effect on them.86  Criminal law 
scholars have pointed to the existence of gangs, where criminal activity is 
celebrated rather than abhorred, as an example of such subcommunities.87  
Another frequently raised objection to shaming sanctions is that offenders 
may be treated differently based on extraneous factors, even though their 
offenses are similar.  Kahan and Posner provide the example of a gifted 
stockbroker who may not suffer too much from shaming for insider trading 
in the long run in comparison with a run-of-the-mill broker who may pay a 
heavier price.88  The potential for this is not exclusive to criminal law sanc-
tions.  All too frequently, one sees some states being attacked as violators of 
human rights when other states seem to escape such treatment.  Compare in 
this connection the international response to the violations of human rights 
by Russia in Chechnya, and China in Tibet, against that to abuses by Serbia 
in Kosovo.  Aside from the lack of consistency in application, critics of 
shame sanctions also contend that the purported cost-benefits of shaming 
  
 83. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE 
LAW 15 (2004); Garvey, supra note 68, at 733; Markel, supra note 40; Toni M. Massaro, The 
Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 646 
(1997) [hereinafter Massaro, Legal Reform]; Massaro, American Criminal Law, supra note 
40. 
 84. Braithwaite writes that “[offenders] associate with others who are perceived in 
some limited or total way as also at odds with mainstream standards.”  JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 67 (1989). 
 85. President Bush accused Iraq, Iran, and North Korea of being part of the axis of 
evil in his State of the Union speech in 2002.  See President George W. Bush, State of the 
Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ne- 
ws/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. (“States like these, and their terrorist allies, consti-
tute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”). 
 86. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 40, at 636. 
 87. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 84, at 4. 
 88. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 40, at 372-73. 
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are not as significant as its proponents claim.89  This attack on shaming’s 
inexpensiveness is based on its proponents undervaluing the cost of estab-
lishing reputations and maintaining them.  If expensive reputations are de-
stroyed without commensurate gain, critics contend that shaming sanctions 
lose much of their cost advantage.90 
Further, costs are incurred when shame sanctions have to be imposed. 
This is principally the cost of engaging in the conduct signifying the moral 
disapproval.  Whether it is the forgoing of otherwise profitable interactions 
or the cost of conveying the disapproval in another manner, these measures 
are costly.91  Professor Skeel lists several costs that might have to be in-
curred in the corporate context.92  Analogous costs are readily apparent in 
international law. 
Given the dependence on group membership, some scholars attack 
shaming as unworkable when a coherent community does not exist.93  The 
key exponent of this view is Professor Massaro, who points out that the 
United States is not socially interdependent, and the heterogeneity in society 
creates problems of definition pertaining to the kinds of punishments that 
might engender a feeling of shame.94  This strain of criticism is rooted in the 
external dimensions of shaming.  While there is some merit in the argument, 
it is by no means necessary for there to be a community, in the strict sense 
of the term, for shaming sanctions to work.  It is sufficient that people share 
certain values or ideals with others, regardless of whether they belong to 
any kind of community with those that share them.  In the international 
arena, the fact that states belong to organizations and alliances, and that 
people across states share religions, languages, and values, and engage in 
mutually beneficial transactions, suggests that there is enough in common to 
satisfy the external dimension of shame.  To be sure, these common norms 
are possibly few in number, and there is dispute as to what kinds of conduct 
fall under their aegis.  For example, a substantial portion of the international 
public shares the norm that torture should not be used as an instrument of 
coercion by states, and that prisoners of war should be treated with dignity.95  
  
 89. Id. at 372. 
 90. Massaro, American Criminal Law, supra note 40. 
 91. Skeel, Jr., supra note 40. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Massaro, American Criminal Law, supra note 40. 
 94. Id. at 1923.  See also Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy 
of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2194 (2003) (“Thus, even 
if a particular community could theoretically impose shame on an offender, a given judge’s 
particular method of accomplishing that goal may still be off the mark.”). 
 95. A BBC World Service poll of more than 27,000 people in 25 countries found 
that 59 percent of the world’s citizens were “unwilling to compromise on the protection of 
human rights while 29 percent think governments should be allowed to use some degree of 
torture in order to combat terrorism.”  World Public Opinion.org, World Citizens Reject 
Torture, BBC Global Poll Reveals (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pi- 
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It is indeed the basis for our laws of war.96  Secondly, the international law 
universe is extremely interdependent.  Commercial and social linkages are 
so strong that no state can afford to ignore other actors without paying a 
very heavy price.  This price can, inter alia, take the form of lost business 
opportunities, withdrawal of state invitations, flight of capital, collapse of 
the state’s credit rating, derision of peers, removal from international insti-
tutions, and expulsion from social clubs and other organizations.97  Mas-
saro’s point about heterogeneity, while particularly apposite in the interna-
tional law context at the surface level, is less of a problem when it comes to 
the norms this Article is concerned with.  Most people are peace-loving and 
consider cruelty to be shameful.  Even if the populace of the state does not 
regard cruelty toward prisoners as shameful,98 the very process of interac-
tion with others who do, and make it known, is unlikely to make all but the 
most thick-skinned of people immune to feelings of shame and embarrass-
ment.  This fact makes shame work for the rational actor who finds that the 
conduct has low utility. 
Martha Nussbaum offers a different critique in her book Hiding from 
Humanity, arguing that legal actors should abjure shame and disgust be-
cause it allows them to hide from their humanity.99  This is similar to Mas-
saro’s contention that shaming penalties convey the message that “offenders 
  
pa/articles/home_page/261.php?nid=&id=&pnt=261&lb=hmpg1.  58% of Americans were 
against the use of torture.  Id.  A series of polls by Retro Poll on the use of torture by the U.S. 
government found that 67.3% of the respondents “knew torture is against U.S. laws and a 
war crime.”  Press Release, Retro Poll, Public Opinion on Torture, the Iraq War, and Civil 
Liberties, New Findings from Retro Poll (May 5, 2005), http://www.common- 
dreams.org/news2005/0505-14.htm.  An ACLU poll found that 80% of Democrats, 87% of 
Independents, and 74% of Republicans who responded wanted to “‘make it clear that the 
policy of the United States is to oppose torture and follow the Geneva Conventions.’”  
American Civil Liberties Union, New Poll: Majority of American Voters Want Next Presi-
dent to Restore and Protect Civil Liberties; Seek a More Assertive Congress (Oct. 4, 2007), 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/32084res20071004.html.  See also Empirical Legal 
Studies Blog, The Polls—Torture (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.elsblog.org/the_empir- 
ical_legal_studi/2007/12/the-polls---tor.html. 
 96. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra 
note 6, art. 3; Convention Against Torture, supra note 6. 
 97. For example, Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth after its military 
coup.  See Should Pakistan be Readmitted to the Commonwealth?, BBC NEWS, Nov. 4, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/2385943.stm.   
 98. The BBC Poll referred to in note 97, for example, found that more respondents 
from India favored relaxing the rules against torture than not.  Press Release, BBC, World 
Citizens Reject Torture, Global Poll Suggests (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.bbc.co.- 
uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2006/10_october/19/poll.shtml (“Thirty-two percent say 
using physical coercion is sometimes permissible—a bit more than the 23% who say existing 
rules should be maintained.”).  The poll also found that the “largest percentage endorsing 
torture is found in Israel where 43% say that some degree of torture should be allowed, 
though slightly more (48%) say the practice should be prohibited.”  Id. 
 99. NUSSBAUM, supra note 83. 
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subjected to these penalties are less than human others who deserve our 
contempt.”100  The dehumanizing aspect of shaming is also troubling to 
Flanders, who writes that “shaming punishments involve the public in an 
exceptionally intimate way, and thereby risk making punishment a mob-like 
affair, where personal vengeance rules, instead of professional, bureaucratic 
impartiality . . . .”101 
Nussbaum contends that shame and disgust are never constructive in 
law.102  In circumstances where disgust has salience, she argues that indigna-
tion is actually the preferable emotion.103  Her case is predicated on the idea 
that disgust is not an emotion that is the product of logic and rationality, or 
that has a significant correlation with the harm that has been caused by the 
offender, and that when one feels disgust, the usual reaction is to turn away 
or recoil from the issue rather than to deal with it effectively.104  With regard 
to shame, Nussbaum believes that it can spill over onto family members and 
associates of those who are shamed.  This feature is not unique to social 
sanctions and can have beneficial consequences—the fear that they will be 
tarnished by the imposition of the sanction creates strong incentives for 
family members and associates to attempt to influence the offender’s behav-
ior by putting pressure on the offender to conform to the law or norm.  Such 
influence can commence from the very early years of each individual, with 
the parents instilling values and morals, with the objective of ensuring that 
the child grows up to become a good person.  While seemingly conceding 
that point, Nussbaum seems to focus more on the negative consequences of 
shaming innocent third parties without corresponding deterrence benefits, a 
  
 100. Massaro, Legal Reform, supra note 83, at 699-700 (she is troubled by “the caste 
features of punishment” which are “jarring in a political order that makes equality a cultural 
baseline”). 
 101. Flanders, supra note 44, at 16 (“Unlike imprisonment, shaming punishments 
require that citizens participate in degrading the offender: They require that citizens adopt 
certain negative attitudes towards the offender, in order that he literally feels society’s disgust 
toward him.  It does not seem right that a liberal state encourages its citizens to act this way   
. . . .”). 
 102. NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 231-32 (writing about the divisive nature of sham-
ing activity, she contends that  “the shamers set themselves up as a ‘normal’ class above the 
shamed, and thus divide society into ranks and hierarchies”).  For a critique, see Peter H.  
Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making: 
Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1055 
(2006) (“[T]his argument alone is insufficient to convince the reader that it is necessary to 
purge disgust from legal and social thinking.  We draw a different conclusion from the same 
information, which is that before disgust can be potentially useful, it must be actively man-
aged.”). 
 103. NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 75.  Nussbaum defines “indignation” as anger 
triggered by unfairness.  Id. 
 104. Nussbaum writes that disgust is “unworthy of guiding public action” and “a 
dangerous social sentiment.”  Id. at 171. 
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problem not unique to social sanctions.105  Nussbaum’s point about hiding 
from humanity is apt.  Indeed, there are serious dangers in the international 
context due to cultural barriers and the ready tendency to demonize that 
which is unknown.  The risk of tarring whole cultures with a broad brush is 
a possibility, and has materialized in some contexts.  One possible check is 
for enforcement to be delegated to the hands of responsible institutions 
rather than the masses. 
B.  Dependence on Internalization 
Shaming is most effective when the offender has internalized the norm 
that is allegedly violated.106  The very purpose of shaming on the external 
dimension is for the individual to understand the seriousness of his actions 
and to internalize the norm.107  In the absence of internalization, the en-
forcement action humiliates the offender without corresponding gain.  In 
United States v. Gementera, a case involving mail theft, the district court 
pointed out that ‘“ultimately, the objective here is, one, to deter criminal 
conduct, and, number two, to rehabilitate the offender so that after he has 
paid his punishment, he does not reoffend, and a public expiation of having 
offended is, or at least it should be, rehabilitating in its effect.’”108  The court 
was keen to emphasize that humiliation was not the objective.109  Rather, 
after internalization the offender must accept that his conduct has lowered 
himself either in his own eyes or in the eyes of people whose opinion he 
cares about.110  Internalization facilitates conformity whereas humiliation is 
  
 105. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Virtually all 
individuals who are convicted of serious crimes suffer humiliation and shame, and many may 
be ostracized by their communities.”). 
 106. Internalization makes the offender follow the norm regardless of its enforce-
ment.  See Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-
Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999). 
 107. As the U.S. District Court said in United States v. Gementera, 
[H]e needs to understand the disapproval that society has for this kind of conduct, 
and that’s the idea behind the humiliation.  And it should be humiliation of having 
to stand and be labeled in front of people coming and going from a post office as 
somebody who has stolen the mail. 
379 F.3d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the district court’s remarks at the first sentencing 
hearing). 
 108. Id. 
 109. The objective was not ‘“to subject defendant to humiliation for humiliation’s 
sake, but rather to create a situation in which the public exposure of defendant’s crime and 
the public exposure of defendant to the victims of his crime.’” Id. at 602. 
 110. As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Gementera, 
He needs to be shown that stealing mail has victims; that there are people who de-
pend upon the integrity and security of the mail in very important ways and that a 
crime of the kind that he committed abuses that trust which people place in the 
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more likely to engender resentment.  This poses problems in the interna-
tional law context because of the difficulty presented by the actors being 
aggregations rather than individuals, and the possibility for some constitu-
ents to become extremely resentful.  Is it possible for aggregations like 
states to internalize norms?  At a theoretical level, there is no reason why 
aggregate entities cannot internalize certain norms.  Even if this is arguable, 
for the purposes of this Article, it suffices that disaggregating a state pre-
sents conditions suitable for norm internalization.  If individuals within a 
state have internalized a norm, at some tipping point it can be said that the 
state has internalized the norm.  This is especially true if that group with the 
internalized norm controls the state’s agenda because it is in power.  With-
out internalization, reputational taints can certainly be suffered, but shame 
cannot be felt.  In the absence of internalization, it is very likely that the 
reaction of the offender will be anger against those enforcing the sanction.111  
Confronted with retaliation, the enforcers also experience anger and engage 
in a fresh round of punishment.112  Thus, multiple rounds of sanctioning 
behavior can stem from anger at the primary sanction, causing a rapid spi-
raling down effect.113  Au contraire, if the offender has internalized the 
norm, remorse and guilt are the likely emotions.  This stops the parties from 
falling into a retaliatory sanctioning cycle and will make the punishment 
  
mail.  He needs to see that there are people who count on the mails and integrity of 
the mails.  How else can he be made to realize that than by coming face-to-face 
with people who use the postal service?  That’s the idea. 
379 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the determination of the district court). 
 111. Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 25, at 16. 
The effect of anger becomes obvious once we examine the interaction of anger and 
shame.  In this case, a clear result is obtained.  Namely, second movers who were 
angry and felt no shame retaliate more and more frequently than second movers 
who were angry and felt shame . . . .  For second movers who were not angry, there 
are no significant differences between those who felt no shame and those who did 
. . . . 
Id. 
 112. Id. at 2 (“[W]e find that many individuals punish back after being punished.  In 
various cases this escalates as individuals punish each other in turns, resulting in consider-
able welfare losses.”).  See also Nikos Nikiforakis, Punishment and Counter-punishment in 
Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves? (Univ. of Melbourne Dept. of Econ., 
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=764185.  Nikiforakis’s experi-
ment allowed two rounds of sanctions.  After the first round of sanctions, each participant 
knows the quantity of punishment points that each individual assigned to him.  The second 
round allows him to sanction those who sanctioned him.  This round of sanctioning is truly 
retaliatory, and is not a case of punishing those who did not adequately sanction free riders.  
Id. at 3-4. 
 113. Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 25, at 15 (“RESULT 2—First movers who 
punish do so because they are angry.  High intensities of anger are triggered by opportunis-
tic behavior by the second mover, especially if it is unexpected and considered unfair.  Re-
taliation by second movers also makes first movers angry and leads to additional punish-
ment.”). 
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effective.114  Experimental studies confirm that shame and guilt can prevent 
angry responses to punishment.115  One study showed that people who act 
unkindly are not immune from anger when their unkindness is punished, 
apparently expecting kindness despite their own unkindness.116  It was only 
when they internalized the punishment and felt shame did they desist from 
retaliatory behavior.117  The authors of the study, Hopfensitz and Reuben, 
made the actors repeat their behavior in the experiment and found that they 
acted with kindness in the future only when punishment induced shame.118  
This presents interesting insights for punishing torture in international law.  
If states engaging in torture do not acknowledge violating an international 
law norm, they are likely to be angered by the imposition of a shame sanc-
tion by other states.  It is only when they accept that their actions are not in 
line with international law norms will shaming work by inspiring the inter-
nal element and motivating them to act differently in the future.  It is possi-
ble that they will change their behavior even without accepting that torture 
is wrong because, as rational actors, they realize the disutility created by the 
shaming sanction in the form of negative reputational or financial conse-
quences.  Angry and indignant states might thus modify their behavior 
without norm internalization.  While this behavioral modification might 
serve the purpose, it cannot be accurately characterized as stemming from 
shame. 
If internalization is essential, does knowledge of the offense by third 
parties matter?  In the international arena, can a state feel shame if the of-
fense is completely unknown to others?  Theory suggests that this is possi-
  
 114. Id. at 17 (“[O]ur results suggest that high intensities of anger provide second 
movers with a motivation to retaliate and high intensities of shame restrain them from doing 
so.  Furthermore, shame seems to be necessary for punishment to have an effect on how 
second movers adjust their behavior.”). 
 115. Id. at 15 (“[S]econd movers who felt no shame are more likely to retaliate than 
other second movers.  Furthermore, we also find that, for second movers who were punished, 
experiencing shame induces them to correct their behavior.”). 
 116. Id. at 17. 
RESULT 3—Second movers who retaliate do so because they are angry and do 
not feel shame.  In addition, following the feeling of shame, second movers rectify 
their opportunistic behavior.  High intensities of anger are triggered by punish-
ment, especially if the second mover had returned a positive amount.  High intensi-
ties of shame are triggered by opportunistic behavior and are not affected by pun-
ishment. 
Id. at 19. 
 117. Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 25, at 17. 
 118. Id.  Their experiments showed the need for monetary punishments, too: “[O]ur 
results indicate that, it is the combination of feeling shame and receiving monetary punish-
ment that has a significant effect on behavior.  This suggests that shame alone will not have 
an effect if the cooperative norm is not actively enforced.”  Id. at 21. 
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ble.119  There is a body of research in psychology showing that people feel 
shame even when offenses committed by them were hidden from others.120  
If this view is correct, internalization assumes even greater importance.  
Internalization is a check against self-serving attempts at characterizing the 
actions of enforcers as guided by ulterior motives.  Many legal writers121 
have not paid enough attention to this internal dimension.122  Some concede 
that shaming has two dimensions, but prefer to focus only on the second 
dimension.123  For example, Posner writes that one can feel shame even 
when the action does not violate a norm that one has internalized.124  Ac-
cordingly, a state could experience shame because norms entrepreneurs 
publicize torture by its agents, even though it has an internalized norm al-
lowing torture. 
  
 119. Some economists differentiate shame from guilt by the visibility of the offense.  
If the offense is visible to others, under this view, shame is the appropriate emotion.  If, on 
the other hand, the offense has not been observed by others, guilt is the appropriate emotion.  
See Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 
801 (1992). 
 120. June Price Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt and Embarrassment Distinct Emo-
tions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL.1256 (1996). 
 121. Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the 
Legal Academy (Yale Law School Program for Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Pol’y Work-
ing Paper Group, Paper No. 230, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=191392 (point-
ing out that norms scholars continue to base their work on rational choice theory). 
 122. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, With 
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (1999). 
[W]e shall treat humiliation as a form of shame, and shame itself as (1) a purely 
external sanction for (2) violations of the moral code.  It is important to note, how-
ever, that even when viewed purely as an external sanction, that is, as the product 
of the actions or reactions of other people, shame (like guilt) is felt even if other 
people take no action. 
Id.  
 123. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contrac-
tual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (discussing im-
portance of reputational concerns in ensuring compliance with industry norms); Robert D. 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicat-
ing the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665, 1668-69 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cooter, Decentralized Law] (suggesting that third-party enforcement is important in explain-
ing emergence of norms); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) (“[A] norm is like a law, except that a private person sanc-
tions the violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a law.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915 (1996) (discussing 
norms as enforced through social sanctions). 
 124. Posner & Rasmussen, supra note 122, at 371 (“One can also be shamed (though 
the better word here would be ‘humiliated’) for conduct that violates a moral code not one’s 
own, where there is no question of guilt.  During the Cultural Revolution in China, people 
paraded through the streets in dunce caps felt humiliated even if they disapproved of the 
regime and therefore felt no guilt at violating its norms.”). 
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C.  Inconsistent Application and the Lack of Due Process 
Shame sanctions have been attacked as being violative of due process 
principles.125  By their very nature, shaming punishments are frequently 
imposed without any opportunity for the offender to present his case.  Given 
a healthy public appetite for sensationalism and gossip, shaming substitutes 
mob justice for due process.126  There is no means of calibrating the extent 
of the punishment leading to excesses that might destroy the offender.127  It 
is also likely that the task of enforcement will be undertaken by actors with 
particular political agendas that are not shared by the majority, and people 
will be victimized even if they have done nothing wrong.128  There are proc-
essual checks against this occurring with legal sanctions, but with no con-
trols against the abuse of shame sanctions, unequal and inconsistent results 
are possible.  Interest-group capture is a realistic fear in the case of deploy-
ing shame sanctions against states and their leaders, and is a concern that 
has been expressed in other contexts in international law.  For example, in 
the eyes of third-world countries, the non-proliferation norm is used by 
Western nations to prevent them from getting too powerful.129  What is pro-
liferation to a Western nation might not be so for many third-world states, 
and the deployment of shame sanctions based on political ideologies and/or 
economic status can be a threat to their efficacy. 
D.  An Excess of Shaming 
Can there be too much shaming?  Professor Massaro advances such a 
claim.130  If there is a shaming “overload,” people might withdraw from 
  
 125. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1991). 
 126. Whitman, supra note 40, at 1088 (worrying that shaming confers too much 
“enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general populace”). 
 127. The suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he believed to be 
thirteen years of age following a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering reminder of the dangerous 
consequences.  See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid over Child Sex, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07ped- 
ophile.html?ex=1320555600&en=9a849fc4db0d28ce&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.  
 128. Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 601 (2006). 
 129. Geoffrey Hunt, China’s Case against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 
Rationality and Morality, 3(2) J. APPLIED PHIL. 183, 183-99 (1986). 
 130. Massaro, American Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1930.  A similar point is 
made by Harel and Klement: “increasing the rate of detection decreases the deterrent effects 
of shaming since it increases the number of shamed individuals in the society and, as was 
shown earlier, such an increase decreases the expected costs of shaming due to the larger 
search costs it imposes on law-abiding individuals.”  Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Eco-
nomics of Shame: Why More Shaming May Deter Less 15 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual 
Mtgs., Working Paper 20, 2005), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=789244. 
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enforcement actions.  Excessive shaming dilutes the norm that is sought to 
be enforced.  If, for example, several states were to embark on nuclear 
weapons programs and all were shamed by multiple enforcers, the stigma 
associated with the action would be lost.  This could lead to the non-
proliferation norm losing its potency, eventually losing its status as a norm.  
Harel and Klement write that the loss of potency creates a dissonance 
between the law’s disapproval of the illegal act, and the willingness of individuals 
to overlook it.  Increasing the rate of shaming may therefore fail not only in substi-
tuting for traditional sanctions’ deterrent functions, but also in reinforcing commu-
nity’s cooperation with the law.  Thus, an increased rate of shaming may paradoxi-
cally undermine the law’s expressive value.131 
As more offenders are shamed, it becomes harder for non-offenders to iden-
tify and isolate them, with the result that the offender does not suffer the 
consequences of shaming.132  Secondly, an increase in the number of 
shamed offenders empowers them to form groups, making enforcement 
ineffective.133  They also write that “the more people shamed, the lesser the 
ability of law-abiding individuals to form law-abiding communities.”134  
This appears to be curious given that it is inconceivable that the law-abiding 
group will be smaller than the offending group.  The proportion of the 
shamers to the shamed at all times must be quite high if the norm is to have 
any meaning.  Otherwise, the norm will be deviance, rather than the conduct 
prescribed by the law.  
Arguments about excess have some truth to them, but the problem of 
excess is not unique to shame.  Similar problems plague every system of 
punishment.  Further, the number of values or norms that characterize the 
relevant international law community is rather small in comparison with the 
number of crimes that might exist in a given national legal system.  The fact 
that the number of possible offenders—at the end of the line of responsibil-
ity—is limited to the number of states and their leaders, limits the possibil-
ity that the community is unable to identify the offender due to the overload.  
At a minimum, shaming can be just as excessive as other forms of punish-
ment—without the costs. 
  
 131. Harel & Klement, supra note 130, at 21; id. at 22 (“Shaming penalties can be 
‘self destructive’ as an extensive use of them may erode their effectiveness.”).   
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at n.38. 
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III. NORMS AND SHAMING 
Social sanctions like shaming can only be effective in achieving desir-
able behavior when they reinforce norms or law.135  There is now a vast lit-
erature on social norms136 that sheds light on the expressive dimensions of 
labeling conduct as prosocial or antisocial.137  This scholarship could pro-
vide a rich vein of material for international law because of its emphasis on 
the role of groups, and their ability to influence behavior.  Norms theorists 
argue that law interacts with social norms by strengthening them, thus fa-
cilitating prosocial behavior.138    
Social norms act as a constraint on otherwise self-interested actions.139  
Several experiments conducted by behavioral economists have shown that 
subjects are constrained by considerations of equity and fairness despite the 
opportunity to be greedy and self-regarding.140  There are several interesting 
problems that crop up when one attempts to apply the social norms scholar-
ship to the use of torture.  The first of these is the perpetual conflict between 
various social norms, each vying for primacy.  Aliter, the norm against tor-
ture is competing with a norm favoring the use of illegal force by the state 
to protect its citizens.  It is difficult to determine which norm should tri-
umph.  It is certainly true that a law that flies in the face of a social norm 
encouraging state violence against prisoners is doomed to fail.  As proven 
by Ellickson’s famous study in Shasta County, the community’s norms 
more effectively allocate the costs of interactions than the law is capable of 
doing.141  Further, as Professor McAdams writes, dissonance between law 
  
 135. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 391 (1997) (explaining the significance of norms in deterring crime); 
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 805, 812 (1998) (explaining the significance of promoting norms through law 
enforcement in inner cities). 
 136. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influ-
ence of Legal and Non-Legal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) 
[hereinafter Eric A. Posner, Regulation of Groups]; Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the 
Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997) [hereinafter Richard A. Pos-
ner, Social Norms]; Sunstein, supra note 123.  Owing to the number of scholars at the Uni-
versity of Chicago doing this work, some have referred to it as the “New Chicago School.”  
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998). 
 137. McAdams, supra note 136, at 341-42. 
 138. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, supra note 136. 
 139. See McAdams, supra note 136, at 340-42; Sunstein, supra note 123, at 904-14. 
 140. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and 
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216-18 (1995). 
 141. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 537, 542-43 (1998). 
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and social norms makes enforcing laws against antisocial conduct diffi-
cult.142 
What explains the power of social norms?  One theory posits that it is 
owed to the value placed by people in belonging to groups.143  If member-
ship is so valuable, the argument is that people will go a long way to pre-
serve that membership, and thus expulsion from the group serves as a pow-
erful sanction.  McAdams bases his thesis on the idea that humans are social 
animals, and that acceptance by others is inherently important.144  It does not 
matter that other rewards flow from this acceptance.  If acceptance is its 
own reward, then people will behave in ways aimed at attaining acceptance, 
even in the absence of other rewards, and in the presence of other costs.145  
Thus, purely self-interested behavior will be constrained to the extent that it 
invites disapprobation, or fails to win approbation.  A pioneering study by 
Lisa Bernstein focusing on the diamond industry showed that the persis-
tence of industry customs can be explained by the value placed by members 
in belonging to the industry group.146  This puts a lid on members’ proclivi-
ties to attempt to gain advantages by short-term competitive behavior—
based on the idea that these short-term benefits are smaller than those pro-
vided by membership in the group.  Studies have shown that groups estab-
lish norms even in incipient or protean conditions, and that these norms 
seem to persist even when the group is absent.147  This might hold explana-
tory power in the context of state behavior. 
Group or club membership also has other significant purposes—for 
example, to signal type to onlookers.  By belonging to NATO, a state could 
signal its hostility to communism.  Thus, membership itself is a source of 
information about the type of actor one is.148  In many instances, the benefits 
of such membership far outweigh the costs of such signaling, and individu-
als might join purely for the benefits, regardless of whether they agree with 
the ideology of the group.149 
  
 142. McAdams, supra note 136, at 348. 
 143. Id. at 356. 
 144. The core assumption of esteem theory is that people have a preference for some-
thing that other people can give or withhold at zero cost: esteem.  Id. at 355.  The assumption 
serves to avoid the collective action problem of norm enforcement.  Because esteem is cost-
less it is not subject to a free rider problem.  Although the preference for esteem is assumed 
to be slight, McAdams shows that it can explain even very costly norm-guided behavior.  Id. 
at 356.   
 145. A similar idea is contained in the peer-pressure-based model of Kandel and 
Lazear.  See Kandel & Lazear, supra note 119, at 802. 
 146. Bernstein, supra note 123, at 116. 
 147. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 
1548 (2000) (sheriff’s experiments). 
 148. Eric A. Posner, Regulation of Groups, supra note 136, at 161. 
 149. Id. at 148.   
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Social norms do exist in international law.150  Despite the absence of 
clear legal standards and liability in many instances, states act in ways that 
are, at least facially, geared at signaling cooperative intent.151  This sort of 
conduct can be explained by the operation of social sanctions.152  Scholars 
argue that actors do the right thing because of the fear of shame or embar-
rassment.153  Other theorists are skeptical about the ability of international 
law to serve as a meaningful constraint on state conduct.154     
A. Social Norm Creation 
Cooter defines a social norm in terms of societal consensus about de-
sirable conduct.155  He explains that agreement about what people ought to 
do is indicative of a possible social norm, but disagreement might be sug-
gestive of a struggle to establish a social norm.156  This is, however, not a 
sufficient condition for the establishment of a social norm.  Cooter’s formu-
lation requires that the social norm be an “effective consensus obligation”—
people must not only agree that a social norm exists, but must act in accor-
dance with that norm.157  He gives due attention to a somewhat neglected 
aspect of social norms—the internalization element, writing that people 
make a moral commitment when they internalize a social norm.158  Cooter’s 
  
 150. See generally Wexler, supra note 39 (explaining the expansion of international 
norms); Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). 
 151. See, e.g., ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES ANNOUNCE JOINT DESIGNATION (2004) http://www.saudiembassy.net/documen- 
ts/Newsletter_JointPressConference_Jan04.pdf (announcing the Saudi-U.S. cooperation on 
terrorism). 
 152. See Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive Interna-
tional Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 84 (2007). 
 153. See Wexler, supra note 39, at 566. 
 154. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 
(2005). 
 155. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586-87 
(1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=111408, at *2 [hereinafter Cooter, Expressive 
Law].  Ellickson defines norms as rules of behavior that are enforced primarily not by courts, 
but by other forces.  See Ellickson, supra note 121, at 35-37.  For Posner & Rasmussen: 
A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation 
or enforcement.  Examples range from table manners and the rules of grammar to 
country club regulations and standard business practice.  Norms may be independ-
ent of laws, as in the examples just given, or may overlap them; there are norms 
against stealing and lying, but also laws against these behaviors. 
Posner & Rasmussen, supra note 122, at 369.   
 156. Cooter, Expressive Law, supra note 155, at 587. 
 157. Id. 
 158. “Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological 
penalty to a forbidden act.  A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys 
an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences.”  Cooter, 
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emphasis on internalization is a richer formulation and is in contrast to sev-
eral other scholars who seem content to rely upon norms being enforced by 
third parties without much regard for the impact on the offender, beyond 
considerations such as negatively affected reputation.   
Cooter distinguishes between the consequences of internalization for 
cooperative and noncooperative settings, stating that internalization can be 
beneficial in the former.159  It is precisely this scenario that we are con-
fronted with in the case of torture.  If states engage in concealing all in-
stances of torture, it is inevitable that other states and international organiza-
tions will work towards monitoring them with greater vigor.  This will di-
vert resources away from more productive uses, and while both these 
states/international organizations and the torturing state will have to bear 
these costs, it is probable that the latter bears the brunt of the costs.  This is 
because of the relatively large number of other states, which brings down 
individual costs for each state, and because several egregious programs will 
be unraveled by the increased scrutiny.  Thus, while the most secretive of 
states will succeed in concealing torture, the mediocre and worst states will 
suffer heavily because of this increased monitoring.  Given this reality, all 
states would be better off by internalizing a social norm against torture. 
The nub of Cooter’s argument is that positive law can influence ra-
tional actors to change their character.160  Ergo, if a law sanctions torture, it 
is likely that states would be influenced to give up cruelty toward prisoners 
of war.  Given the costs associated with this, Cooter seems to imply that 
shaming can achieve the same result at lower cost.  Thus, the ability to pub-
licly shame states that engage in torture makes it possible that states will be 
influenced to give up torture as an instrument of state policy.  Abstinence 
signals to the international community respect for the rule of law and indi-
vidual dignity.  The use of torture, on the other hand, signals to the interna-
tional community that these states are not good participants in cooperative 
settings and that they are liable to privilege short-term self-interest over 
individual dignity and rule of law.  This can only work if the details of acts 
  
Expressive Law, supra note 155, at 586; see also Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 123, 
at 1665. 
 159. He writes: 
In a noncooperative setting, moral restraint is a disadvantage, rather like fighting 
with one hand tied behind your back.  In cooperation ventures, however, moral re-
straint can increase productivity, so people with good character may enjoy an ad-
vantage over people with bad character.  For example, agents who faithfully serve 
their principals increase the productivity of principal-agent relationships by reduc-
ing monitoring costs. 
Cooter, Expressive Law, supra note 155, at 587.  McAdams also stresses that people obey 
internalized norms even when they would suffer no adverse consequences if they disobeyed 
them.  See McAdams, supra note 136, at 376; Symposium, supra note 150.  
 160. Cooter, Expressive Law, supra note 155, at 586. 
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of torture are made public and if states are parties to future interactions that 
require cooperation with other states.161  
There is considerable evidence for the view that rational actors do be-
have in ways that are other-regarding.  The expectations of others appear to 
be a key determinant in several experimental studies.162  Perhaps obviously, 
these studies show that such expectations only play a role up to a point 
when they are in conflict with self-interest.  An analysis of social dilemma 
games found that as the personal cost incurred by cooperating in a social 
dilemma rises, cooperation rates tended to fall.163  Studies of dictator games 
show that if a proposer offers a relatively larger share of the money, the 
likelihood that the responder will spitefully reject it decreases.164  Thus, 
people are only willing to be spiteful if the cost of being spiteful is not too 
high.  While this is true for participants in the game, spite might be costless 
to observers, and they might step into the breach and engage in spiteful be-
havior, ensuring that proposers are honest.  So, while states having interests 
that cannot be compromised might evaluate the cost of spiteful behavior and 
conclude that it is too high, observers who are not in that position, either 
because of geographic or financial distance, can engage in spiteful behavior 
at low or no cost.  This can serve as a sufficient sanction for enforcing the 
social norm. 
A norm can only be created with common knowledge and awareness 
of the sanctions that befall violation.  Norms entrepreneurs have a powerful 
role to play in this regard.  They are likely to be much more successful at 
creating norms than states are.165  Norms have long gestation periods, and 
acceptable conduct does not become unacceptable without conditioning.  
Norms entrepreneurs facilitate conditioning, frequently with the assistance 
of the law.  The social meaning of conduct can be changed by the law, and 
  
 161. Stout makes a similar point:  
[E]xternal incentives, alone, can only influence the behavior of the rationally self-
ish actor when two criteria are met.  First, her behavior must be observable to oth-
ers.  Second, some one (or something) must be both willing and able to reward her 
good behavior and to punish her bad behavior—and to reward or punish suffi-
ciently.  
Lynn Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms 20 (Geo. Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper No. 265902, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab- 
stract_id=265902. 
 162. Id. at 13, 15. 
 163. David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-
Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 66 (1995). 
 164. Stout, supra note 161, at 17. 
 165. Posner and Rasmussen make a similar point about nongovernmental organiza-
tions: “Nongovernmental organizations may be more effective than either individuals or 
governments in this regard, but it is not clear whether a society that gives ample scope to 
norm changing organizations will have more or less norm creation and stability.”  Posner & 
Rasmussen, supra note 122, at 379. 
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norms entrepreneurs employ this for conditioning.  This is precisely what 
has transpired in the torture case.  Norms entrepreneurs frequently highlight 
instances of torture and put pressure on state agencies to take corrective 
action.166  This serves to condition both the state and citizens. 
B.  The Cost of Enforcing Social Sanctions 
To be sure, inflicting any kind of sanction is costly.167  Even in the 
McAdams Esteem Model,168 the very act of withholding esteem is not as 
costless as he suggests.  The enforcer of the sanction, whether it is even a 
relatively passive sanction such as shunning or avoiding the wrongdoer, still 
has to pay a price, which might range from confrontation to embarrassment.  
This cost is the measure of the enforcer’s position post-sanction relative to 
the enforcer’s position pre-sanction.169  The costs are not distributed 
  
 166. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Counter Terror with Justice, 
http://www.amnesty.org/stoptorture (last visited Mar. 27, 2008); Amnesty Int’l, Cruel.  In-
human.  Degrades us All.  Stop Torture and Ill-Treatment In . . . (2005), http://www.amn- 
esty.org/en/library/asset/ACT40/010/2005/en/Xc3jXzDa2LwJ; Rights for All, Torture and 
Abuse of Prisoners, http://www.rightsforall.amnesty.org/what/appeals/torture.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 27, 2008); AMNESTY INT’L, INDIA: TIME TO ACT TO STOP TORTURE AND IMPUNITY IN 
WEST BENGAL (2001), http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA2003320- 
01?open&of=ENG-IND; Amnesty Int’l, Egypt, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/- 
Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Egypt (last visited Mar. 27, 2008); Human Rights Watch, 
Human Rights News, Torture and Abuse, http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=torture (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008); Human Rights First, Law & Security, http://www.humanrights- 
first.org/us_law/etn/index.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
 167. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 211 (1981).  See also Doron 
Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 355, 363 (2005) (“In the context of SORNLs, for example, these costs include 
setting up notification websites, updating these websites, tracking down offenders, and ac-
tively notifying communities.”).  Teichman points out that: 
[n]on-legal sanctions are unique because through their use, the government can ex-
ternalize some of the costs of sanctioning to the public.  The amount of sanctions 
inflicted can therefore be raised without tapping into a limited government budget.  
Not only is this true both of the costs of non-legal sanctions, which are quite obvi-
ously born by the sanctioning public, but is also true with respect to the costs of in-
ducing non-legal sanctions. 
Id. at 364 n.38. 
 168. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997). 
 169. Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to 
the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1994) (pointing out problems of implement-
ing SORNLs associated with their costs).  Denise M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing 
Debate Over Megan’s Law; Some Question Whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime.  The 
State Statute is Set to Expire Next Year, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at B2 (California Attor-
ney General pointing out that verifying registration would cost the state $15 million to $20 
million, which is a “hefty request” given the California budget deficit). 
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evenly—free-riding is a real possibility.170  To be sure, secondary benefits 
such as a reputation for courage, integrity, and willingness to enforce the 
norm accrue to those who pay the price.  States will engage in a cost-benefit 
calculation to determine if these secondary benefits outweigh the free-rider 
problem.  Some scholars characterize such actors as “shame-centered en-
forcers.”171  Paying the enforcement price also helps to stave off a sanction 
against passivity that other enforcers might impose.172  There is evidence of 
passive actors being punished by aggressive enforcers.173  Effective secon-
dary shaming mitigates the free-rider problem.174 
This suggests that enforcers must engage in a cost-benefit calculus to 
ensure their individual benefits exceed costs, unless they are content to im-
pose the sanction regardless of costs, because of principle, altruism, or some 
similar reason.  If such a calculation is inevitable, then the enforcer will 
quickly realize that he has several options in the sanction shopping-basket, 
each with a different cost.  If he chooses the shunning sanction, the cost is 
likely to be the opportunity cost of interacting with the offender, which it-
self varies with the unique attributes of the offender.  If the offender is a 
close relative or friend, opportunities for interaction are likely to be fre-
quent, and shunning might require more effort.  If, on the other hand, the 
  
 170. McAdams, supra note 168, at 352-53. 
 171. Harel & Klement, supra note 130, at 5 (“They do not care whether the individu-
als they interact with are offenders or not.  They are, however, reluctant to interact with 
shamed individuals.  Such reluctance may be attributed to the unwillingness to be publicly 
observed interacting with shamed individuals.  Interaction with the shamed might signal to 
third parties that those interacting with them are also ‘bad types.’”). 
 172. This is the idea behind the signaling theory postulated by Eric Posner, whereby 
people are either “co-operators” who have a low discount rate, or “cheaters” who have a high 
discount rate.  See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the 
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 765-72 (1998).  Cooperators and cheaters all play repeated 
games in which the former maximize their payoffs by interacting among themselves.  Id.  To 
exclude cheaters, cooperators can use costly signals that only individuals who expect the 
high cooperative payoff can afford to send.  Id.  The cost incurred by the sanctioning party is 
exactly what makes the infliction of the non-legal sanction a credible signal.  Id.  People who 
are passive are seen to be non-co-operators, and are excluded from profitable interactions 
with cooperators.  Id. 
 173. See William Muraskin, The Harlem Boycott of 1934:  Black Nationalism and the 
Rise of Labor-Union Consciousness, 13 LAB. HIST. 361, 364 (1972) (presenting a case in 
which the photographers of boycott violators were published in a local newspaper); Sankar 
Sen et al., Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts, 
28 J. CONSUMER RES. 399, 401 (2001) (pointing out the connection between consumer boy-
cotts and group membership).   
 174. Laurent Denant-Boemont et al., Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction 
Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment 3 (2005), available at http://userwww.serv- 
ice.emory.edu/~cnoussa/index.html (“Because individuals who administer sanctions bear the 
cost of doing so, while all players benefit from the resulting increase in contributions, there is 
an incentive for individuals to free ride on others’ provision of sanctions against low con-
tributors.”). 
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offender is a state which is a member of the same regional organization, 
shunning may not be terribly costly.  If the enforcer wants to pick shaming 
from the basket, the cost is clearly greater than shunning.  The enforcer has 
to undertake more positive actions, such as speaking out publicly about the 
offender’s bad conduct, with the increased risk of confrontation by the of-
fender.  The enforcer might conclude that he is willing to pay the price that 
shunning presents, but is unwilling to pay the price of shaming.  In other 
words, shunning is more affordable than shaming. 
If all sanctions come with costs, why and when are enforcers willing 
to bear those costs?  Experiments conducted by behavioral economists show 
that people are frequently motivated to impose sanctions based on reciproc-
ity.175  In other words, people want to do unto others as has been done to 
them.  Results from ultimatum games have shown that people are willing to 
pay a monetary cost in order to punish those who have treated them in ways 
that they perceive to be deserving of punishment.176  Reciprocity, in turn, 
seems to allow participants in repeated games to maximize their personal 
payoffs.177  While reciprocity in bilateral situations seems intuitive enough, 
what is interesting for our purposes is the evidence suggesting that reciproc-
ity seems to be transferable—people view injustices perpetrated on others as 
if they had been perpetrated on themselves, and punish the offender.178  One 
example is the anti-Nazi boycotts during World War II.179  Thus, states 
might be willing to sanction other states that torture regardless of the fact 
that the individuals tortured were not their citizens.  It suffices that the citi-
zens of other states are at risk.  Transferable reciprocity is key to explaining 
why states bear the costs of norm enforcement in international law.  This 
explains the harsh reaction of European states to the Abu Ghraib episode 
although few (if any) European citizens were victims of abuse. 
  
 175. Werner Güth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982). 
 176. Id.  See generally Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of In-
centives, 46 EURO. ECON. REV. 687, 689-704 (2002); Werner Güth, On Ultimatum Bargain-
ing Experiments—A Personal Review, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 329, 329-43 (1995); 
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE:  PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 
21-35 (1992). 
 177. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (showing 
how a reciprocal strategy can lead to higher payoffs for a player in a repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma). 
 178. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 
S285, S290-92 (1986).  The results of the experiment were clear—seventy-four percent of 
the players in the second round chose to sacrifice their monetary well-being in order to sanc-
tion individuals that treated other players unfairly.  Id.   
 179. William Orbach, Shattering the Shackles of Powerlessness: The Debate Sur-
rounding the Anti-Nazi Boycott of 1933-41, 2 MOD. JUDAISM 149, 161-66 (1982). 
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C.  The Role of Norms Entrepreneurs and Change Agents 
These actors facilitate the creation of new norms.180  Their advantage 
in supplying new norms is based on superior technical knowledge and lead-
ership skills.  Professor Ellickson defines “norms entrepreneurs” as people 
who “possess a relatively high level of technical knowledge relevant to the 
norms within [their] specialty. . . .  [They are] likely to be cognizant that 
there are appreciative experts . . . who are likely immediately to esteem the 
norm entrepreneur for trying to change the social practice at issue.”181  There 
are several examples of norms entrepreneurs resorting to shaming tech-
niques to enforce social norms in international law.182   
Politicians and international bureaucrats, in some instances, attempt to 
appease these norms entrepreneurs.  Their success is owed to a signaling 
effect—politicians want to signal to their constituents that they are working 
to advance their welfare, and by adopting the agendas of norms entrepre-
neurs, such signaling is achieved at low cost.  It might also be dangerous for 
politicians with constituents who support the work of norms entrepreneurs 
to be seen doing nothing.183  They might be exposing themselves to secon-
dary shaming—as people who are too cowardly to enforce the social norm, 
and hence undeserving of reelection.  Norms entrepreneurs create condi-
tions for the birth of a secondary sanction in order to enforce the underlying 
norm.  When the risk of this sanction attaches to powerful groups like poli-
ticians who might otherwise free-ride, it advances the enforcement of the 
social norm enormously.  This seems to be at the root of the activity against 
torture. 
  
 180. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules 
in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2112 (2001) (giving the ex-
ample of Murakami in Japanese corporate law). 
 181. Ellickson, supra note 121, at 19 (citation omitted). 
 182. See discussion of Amnesty International infra. 
 183. Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Re-
sults from Rural Zimbabwe (Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper Series 
No. 2001-11, 2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/csae/paper149/.  “[S]anctions 
would be imposed upon non-cooperators by cooperators because by not cooperating the 
former are preventing the latter from getting their fair share.  If the imposition of sanctions 
reduces the payoff to the sanctionee more than the payoff to the sanctioner, cooperators can 
redress this imbalance by sanctioning non-cooperators.”  Id. at 3.  Barr writes that her, 
results provide strong evidence that the shame-based sanctions anticipated and im-
posed by the communities that took part in my experiments were effective at pro-
moting cooperation.  Villagers in Zimbabwe clearly care about what other people 
think of them and will modify their behaviour in order to improve their status in 
the eyes of their neighbours. 
Id. at 13.  See also Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999). 
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The credibility of the nongovernmental organization or the norm en-
trepreneur is closely related to its efficacy.  One example is Amnesty Inter-
national (AI), an independent nongovernmental organization that campaigns 
for human rights.  It is essentially a network of people from around the 
world, and at latest count, its membership is about 2.2 million strong.184  AI 
conducts research to highlight abuses around the world by traveling to the 
major conflict zones, speaking to the relevant actors, and then determining 
if human rights abuses are taking place and to what extent.  Its objective is 
to determine the level of participation of the government in the violations of 
human rights, and to ultimately establish the particular pieces of interna-
tional law that the abuses violate.  These are documented in their Annual 
Report of human rights abuses worldwide, or in a country or regional report 
published occasionally.  Describing the work of AI, William Schultz, a key 
officer said:  
Our power is primarily the power of mobilizing grass-roots people to speak out. 
‘The mobilization of shame’ is one way to put it.  The eyes of the world shining on 
the prisons and into the dark corners of police stations and military barracks all 
over the world to try to bring international pressure to bear upon governments 
which are committing human rights violations.185   
Shaming is a key facet of AI’s work: the advertisements, leaflets, 
posters, postcards, newsletters, and websites are all elements of the deploy-
ment of shame.  By publicizing abuses, AI hopes to modify behavior by 
putting pressure on wrongdoers.  Given the scale of the network, and the 
credibility acquired over decades of work, a campaign by AI can have sig-
nificant impact.186  Apart from providing information to opinion leaders, 
Amnesty is certainly emphasizing a moral component in the nature of its 
campaigning.  Very frequently, the reports issued call to the reader’s moral 
compass, perhaps a necessity if the offending state has not ratified a legal 
instrument, which it can be said to be violating.  Moral arguments are also 
important because international law instruments like the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights have no teeth.  The kinds of abuses at the heart of 
  
 184. See Amnesty Int’l, Who We Are, http://amnesty.org/en/who-we-are (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008). 
 185. Bill Steigerwald, Human Rights and Wrongs, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Mar. 29, 2003, 
available at http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/steigerwald- 
/s_126235.html.  See also Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law Proceedings, Aids Crisis Breakfast, 84 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 177, 179 (1990) (stating that “what Amnesty International calls a 
‘mobilization of shame,’ can be effective” in lifting travel restrictions on people with AIDS). 
 186. See Amnesty Int’l, The History of Amnesty International, 
http://amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).  A sample Amnesty 
International flyer has the following quote from a former torturer from El Salvador: “[I]f 
there’s lots of pressure—like from Amnesty International or some foreign countries—we 
might pass them on to a judge.  But if there’s no pressure, then they’re dead.” Amnesty Int’l, 
www.amnestyusa.org/youth/doc/sample_tabling_materials.doc (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
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AI’s work involve the commission of atrocities in connection with war or 
internal conflict—both scenarios ripe for the infliction of harm on a scale 
most conducive to inciting outrage in those who learn of the atrocities.187  
AI’s work also appears to be more effective when the reports pertain to cer-
tain countries.  A brief examination reveals that democracies are more re-
sponsive to shaming by AI, probably owed to the fact that domestic con-
stituencies opposed to the political party in power can use the report to at-
tack the government, and thereby cause it to change its behavior.188  It is 
also likely that AI fares better when it shames larger and more prominent 
states, rather than when it shames smaller and strategically less important 
states.  This is owed to the newsworthiness of the reports issued by AI—a 
bad report about an important or large state is likely to be more attractive to 
the international news media and is hence likely to be carried widely in 
other outlets.  A report about a small or strategically less important state is 
more likely to be ignored.  One successful example of a shaming campaign 
by NGOs against a large state is that against the United States for the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders.  Amnesty repeatedly named and shamed the 
United States as one of only a handful of countries that had executed chil-
dren since 1990.189  The long campaign against the United States appears to 
have played a role in the Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the death pen-
alty for minors.190  The external dimension of shaming seems to have been 
recognized by President Carter, who said that the ruling made the United 
States a part of “the community of nations.”191  Agencies like Amnesty 
International have long called the death penalty “a human rights violation 
  
 187. Lynne Miriam Baum, Pursuing Justice in a Climate of Moral Outrage: An 
Evaluation of the Rights of the Accused in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 197 (2001). 
 188. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 264 (1997); see also Vijayashri Sripati, India’s Na-
tional Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2000). 
 189. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.  SHAME IN THE 21ST CENTURY.  
THREE CHILD OFFENDERS SCHEDULED FOR EXECUTION IN JANUARY 2000 (Report—AMR 
51/189/99, Dec. 1999), available at http://www.childrenfirstinternational.org/offi- 
cial/shame21.htm.  An earlier Amnesty Report said, “The USA’s repeated claims that it is 
the most progressive force for human rights in the world are contradicted by its blatant flout-
ing of the global moral and legal consensus that killing people for their childhood crimes is 
wrong.”  Press Release, Amnesty International, Midnight Shame—USA Executes Child 
Offender (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.commondreams.org/pressrel- 
eases/feb99/020499b.htm. 
 190. Julian Borger, US Becomes Last Country to End Death Penalty for Under-18s, 
THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2005, at 3.  Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote: “It is proper that we 
acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional 
imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 578 (2005).  
 191. Julian Borger, supra note 190, at 3. 
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that brings shame on those countries that use it.”192  In a letter from Carole 
Nagengast, Chair of the Board of Directors for Amnesty International USA, 
to Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, AI pointed out that only seven countries—Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—apart from the United States 
had executed juveniles since 1990.193  One writer argued that the United 
States was in violation of international law norms by continuing to execute 
juvenile offenders.194  Nagengast wrote that organizations like Amnesty 
“have success records as effective organizers of letter-writing campaigns 
which could aid in applying legislative pressure” and recognized the effect 
of shame on the political process in the United States.195  Reputation con-
scious states like the United States do not want to be in the company of 
states with the worst records for human rights compliance.  Repeatedly 
naming the United States in that group worked primarily because of the 
existence of a domestic constituency that cared about international opinion.  
The lumping of the United States with states like Iran, Iraq, and China also 
appears to have worked in persuading it to abandon its unilateralist stance 
against the Landmine Ban Treaty.196 
AI has worked primarily by using the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as the embodiment of accepted norms of human rights and has 
sought to highlight conduct that runs afoul of these rights.197  In doing so, it 
can be argued that AI is acting somewhat like a prosecutor.  The absence of 
  
 192. Id. (quoting Kate Allen, Amnesty International’s United Kingdom Director). 
 193. Letter of Carole Nagengast, Chair, Board of Directors, Amnesty Int’l USA, to 
Sen. Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Mar. 27, 
1992, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
 194. Elizabeth A. Reimels, Playing For Keeps: The United States Interpretation of 
International Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty—The U.S. Wants to Play the 
International Human Rights Game, But Only if it Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
303 (2001) (listing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 
6(5); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 37(a), U.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989); Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; and 
the American Convention on Human Rights, art 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Re-
cords OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970), as examples of 
international law embodying such a norm). 
 195. Reimels, supra note 194, at 347 (“It is likely that most Americans are unaware 
that the current position of the United States is so removed from the global consensus.  No 
doubt, many citizens would be horrified to learn that the U.S. position on the juvenile death 
penalty places it in the company of such countries as Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Paki-
stan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.”). 
 196. Wexler, supra note 39, at 575. 
 197. AI USA’s website declares that “Amnesty International’s vision is of a world in 
which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international human rights standards.”  Amnesty Int’l, Our Mission 
and the Movement, http://www.amnestyusa.org/About_Us/Our_Mission_and_the_Move- 
ment/page.do?id=110178&n1=2&n2=762 (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
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a body to assess the evidence to find culpability is arguably not insurmount-
able because of the opportunity for the state that is allegedly engaging in 
illegal conduct to rebut the version of the facts put forth by Amnesty.  How-
ever, there are obvious problems that are hard to overcome.  For example, 
an Amnesty report may highlight custodial torture that is a matter of routine 
in a particular region of a third-world nation.  It may be that the central gov-
ernment has no idea that the torture has been going on, or may know of it 
but may be prevented from doing much because of the lack of cooperation 
from the local government.  Regardless of these facts, the entire state is 
shamed by the report.  This over-inclusiveness of shaming is a serious threat 
to its viability.  Should it matter that the central government did not know of 
the torture or that it tried to stop it but was unable to because of an obstinate 
local government that was comprised of politicians from a different political 
party?  Should Amnesty have desisted from shaming due to these factors?  
Probably not, because the report and consequent shame might provide just 
the impetus to end the abuses.  
Another concern with nongovernmental organizations and private 
norms entrepreneurs pertains to the motivations that these agencies possess. 
It is naiveté to assume that all nongovernmental agencies and norms entre-
preneurs are ideologically neutral and that they do not canvass particular 
agendas.  When judges and arbitrators are not immune from accusations of 
bias, it is foolish to imagine that international NGOs would be.  Several 
governments have accused Amnesty International of bias.198  Notwithstand-
ing these criticisms, AI’s status as a successful norms entrepreneur is not in 
doubt. 
IV. THE CASE OF ABU GHRAIB 
Highlighted first by a CBS 60 Minutes story in April 2004 breaking 
the news of Iraqi prisoners being abused at the Abu Ghraib prison, the epi-
sode has been one of the most embarrassing chapters in U.S. foreign pol-
icy.199  The abuse scandal shocked Americans and became a cause for shame 
  
 198. Hezbollah accused AI of coming under pressure from the U.S. and Israel.  Hiz-
bullah Rejects Amnesty Report, THE JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 14, 2006, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=11
57913630456.  The Anti-Defamation League calls AI anti-Semitic.  Press Release, Anti-
Defamation League, ADL Calls Amnesty International Report “Bigoted, Biased, and Border-
line Anti-Semitic” (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Isl- 
ME_62/4878_62.html.  Elsewhere AI has been accused of being anti-U.S.  Christopher Ar-
changelli, Amnesty International’s War on America, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, June 5, 
2003, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=8231. 
 199. General Mark Kimmit, deputy-director of coalition operations in Iraq, recog-
nized the consequences to America’s ideological battle in his interview with Dan Rather: 
“And if we can’t hold ourselves up as an example of how to treat people with dignity and 
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internationally.200  Between October and December 2003, evidence uncov-
ered showed thousands of photographs and dozens of video clips where 
Iraqi detainees were being humiliated and tortured.201  These included re-
volting images of Iraqi prisoners being made to masturbate in front of fe-
male prison guards202 and simulate sex acts upon each other, being hooded 
and attached to electrical cables, thrown before baying prison dogs, and 
wearing women’s underwear on their heads.203  The scandal first came to 
light on January 13, 2004, and the United States acted swiftly and sus-
pended seventeen soldiers, and also launched a criminal investigation.204  
  
respect . . .  We can’t ask that other nations [do] that to our soldiers as well.  So what would I 
tell the people of Iraq?  This is wrong.  This is reprehensible.”  CBS News, 60 Minutes, 
Abuse at Abu Ghraib (May 4, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/sto- 
ries/2004/05/05/60II/main615781.shtml. 
 200. Darius Rejali, Viewpoint: The Real Shame of Abu Ghraib, TIME, May 20, 2004, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,640375,00.html; Suzanne 
Goldenberg, Abu Ghraib, Symbol of America’s Shame, to Close Within Three Months, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 4, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story- 
/0,2763,1207484,00.html (the events inside Abu Ghraib prison open a shameful episode of 
U.S. ill-treatment of its prisoners, and have provoked worldwide condemnation); America’s 
Shame: Torture in the Name of Freedom, DER SPIEGEL, Feb. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,401899,00.html (“The new pictures from 
Abu Ghraib provide the most recent evidence: America’s moral bank account is empty—and 
it has lost the image wars.”). 
 201. A later New York Times report included testimony suggesting that the following 
events had taken place at Abu Ghraib: urinating on detainees; jumping on a detainee’s leg (a 
limb already wounded by gunfire) with such force that it could not thereafter heal properly; 
and continuing by pounding detainee’s wounded leg with collapsible metal baton.  Kate 
Zernike, Detainees Depict Abuses by Guard in Prison in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at 
A2.  Additionally, a Slate report included testimony regarding pouring phosphoric acid on 
detainees and sodomization of detainees with a baton.  See also William Saletan, Rape 
Rooms: A Chronology, SLATE, May 5, 2004. 
 202. Saletan, supra note 201 (citing Testimony of Military Police Specialist Matthew 
Wisdom, Hearing on Charges of Prisoner Abuse (Apr. 9, 2004), available at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2100014/).   
 203. Goldenberg, supra note 200.  Other abuses uncovered by the Army’s investiga-
tion conducted by Major General Taguba found the following:  
Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees 
and, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee[;] . . . Breaking 
chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; . . . Pouring cold 
water on naked detainees; Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; 
Threatening male detainees with rape; Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light 
and perhaps a broom stick.  
Saletan, supra note 201. 
 204. Transcript of Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, May 4, 2004, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040504-secdef1423.html.  
Amnesty International was not satisfied with a U.S. investigation and demanded an “inde-
pendent and public inquiry into all allegations of the torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. and 
coalition troops.”  Amnesty International Calls for Inquiry into Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, THE 
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Investigations were also launched into the detention facilities at Guan-
tanamo Bay.205  On January 19, 2004, the military launched an investigation 
by Major General Taguba.206  The Taguba Report concluded that “[s]everal 
US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of 
international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq.”207  Follow-
ing expressions of outrage in the international community, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross conducted its own investigation and issued a 
report detailing several human rights abuses committed by coalition 
forces.208  In the outside world, the scandal deepened anger at America for 
the invasion of Iraq,209 and was allegedly indicative of American disdain for 
Muslims and their culture.210  Several states and international organizations 
reacted with outrage.  The International Commission of Jurists in a state-
ment said:  
  
EPOCH TIMES, May 4, 2004, available at http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-5-
4/21248.html. 
 205. Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, supra note 204.  Human 
Rights Watch reported that:  
[a]ccording to [Vice Admiral] Church, he found only eight instances of minor in-
fractions involving contact dating back to 2002.  Two guards were demoted in rank 
and a third was acquitted in a court martial.  Church’s findings were based on in-
terviews with interrogators, guards, military civilians, and contractors.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, he did not interview any detainees.  
Guantanamo: America’s “Black Hole,” HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2004, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/3.htm. 
 206. Saletan, supra note 201. 
 207. MAJOR GEN. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH 
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdo- 
cs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html. 
 208. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), REPORT ON THE TREATMENT BY THE 
COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (Feb. 2004) (on 
file with author). 
 209. Ed Finn, Ghraib Diggers, SLATE, May 6, 2004, available at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2100092; James Risen, G.I.’s are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A15; David Enders, US Torture Nothing New, Say Iraqis; 
Pictures of Troops and their Prisoners Shocked the World, But Many in the Country Are Not 
Surprised, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 5, 2004, at 11. 
 210.  
Qatar’s Al Rayah said “that had the abuse of prisoners in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison 
been committed by any developing Third World country, international reaction, 
especially American, would have been filled with denunciation and punishment 
‘that perhaps includes the liberation of the concerned country in defense of human-
ity’.  (The paper) opined that torture, rape, sodomy and murder continue, which it 
said reflects the ‘decline of the values of American civilization to a point never 
witnessed in history.’” 
John Burke, Overseas Reaction: Disgust over Abu Ghraib, Disbelief over Guantanamo, 
NIEMAN WATCHDOG, Feb. 20, 2006, available at  http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/in- 
dex.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=0074. 
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ICJ members . . . and the African human rights community are deeply concerned 
by recent reports on the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq.  The reports 
of sadistic, wanton and criminal abuses are obscene and shocking.  The interna-
tional human rights community has registered its disapproval of the systematic and 
illegal abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison, notorious for state sponsored 
torture in the Saddam Hussein era.  The African human rights community joins the 
international community in condemning the deliberate dehumanization of prison-
ers, by American soldiers, which amounts to torture and is contrary to established 
international human rights treaties.211 
The growing outrage prompted President Bush to say in his May 2004 
speech to the Carlisle Barracks War College: “[t]hat same prison became a 
symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored 
our country and disregarded our values[.]”212  Nine soldiers were convicted 
and are serving sentences ranging from three years to ten years.213  The offi-
cial U.S. view was that the outrageous conduct was committed by rogue 
soldiers214 acting without instructions from their superiors.215  This charac-
terization was rejected by observers.  Pierre Krähenbühl, Director of Opera-
tions for the ICRC, said that Abu Ghraib represented more than “individual 
acts . . . .  There was a pattern and a system.”216 
The United States tried to distance itself from the events.  President 
Bush reiterated that it “does not reflect the nature of the American peo-
ple.”217  The reaction from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld seemed to stress 
technicalities over substance: 
[W]hat has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different 
from torture. . . .  I don’t know if . . . it is correct to say what you just said, that tor-
  
 211. Programme Management Note, AFRICAN HUM. RTS. AND ACCESS TO JUST. 
PROGRAMME (Int’l Comm’n of Jurists), May 2004, at 1, available at http://www.icj-
kenya.org/ahraj/ahraj_2_5_0504.pdf.  
 212. Dana Milbank, Bush Seeks to Reassure Nation on Iraq; President Vows to Raze 
Abu Ghraib Prison to Mark ‘New Beginning’, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at A1; see also 
Bradley Graham & David Von Drehle, Bush Apologizes for Abuse of Prisoners; Criticism of 
Rumsfeld Intensifies, But President Says His Job is Safe, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, at A22. 
 213. New Abu Ghraib Images Broadcast, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4715540.stm; Eric Schmitt, Army Dog Handler is 
Convicted in Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A1. 
 214. Editorial, Torture Policy, WASH. POST, June 16, 2004, at A26; Crime and Pun-
ishment; War and the Law in Iraq, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2004; Kate Zernike & David Rohde, 
Forced Nudity of Iraqi Prisoners is Seen as a Pervasive Pattern, Not Isolated Incidents, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A14. 
 215. Iraqi Government Denounces Abu Ghraib Abuse, CNN.com, Feb. 16, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/16/abughraib.photos/index.html. 
 216. Hendrik Hertzberg, Comment: Unconventional War, NEW YORKER, May 24, 
2004, at 32. 
 217. Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, supra note 204. 
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ture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction for torture.  And therefore 
I’m not going to address the torture word.”218   
Yet, in a speech to the Congressional Armed Services Committee, his words 
seemed to show that shaming worked: “Mr. Chairman, I know you join me 
today in saying to the world, ‘Judge us by our actions.  Watch how Ameri-
cans, watch how a democracy, deals with wrongdoing and with scandal and 
the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own 
weaknesses.’”219  Supporting the argument made in the preceding pages 
about the need for internalization if anger at shaming is to be prevented, 
some on the conservative extremes of the political spectrum expressed out-
rage at the outrage from the international community220 and domestic liberal 
constituencies!221  However, reactions from the majority of U.S. legislators 
appeared to be at odds with Secretary Rumsfeld.  After being shown photo-
graphs and videos of the abuses, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist said, 
“[w]hat we saw is appalling.”222  Senator Richard J. Durbin said, “[t]here 
were some awful scenes.  It felt like you were descending into one of the 
rings of hell, and sadly it was our own creation.”223  Representative Jane 
Harman said, “I saw cruel, sadistic torture.”224  All of this is indicative of 
internalization of the norm against torture, and the experience of shame 
upon discovery of violation of the norm. 
  
 218. Id.  For criticism, see Sidney Blumenthal, This is the New Gulag, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 6, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/- 
0,12271,1210588,00.html. 
 219. Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Armed Services, 108th Cong. 7 (2004) (testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld). 
 220. Dana Milbank, U.S. Tries to Calm Furor Caused by Photos, WASH. POST, May 
1, 2004, at A1 (“Arab countries were more strident, with the Arab League calling the mis-
treatment ‘savage acts’ . . . .”). 
 221. Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe said at a Senate Armed Services Committee 
hearing on the scandal, “I’m probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged 
by the outrage than we are by the treatment.”  See Walter Shapiro, Senator ‘Outraged’ by 
Reaction to Prisoner Abuse, USA TODAY, May 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/shapiro/2004-05-11-hype_x.htm.  He 
seemed to reserve his contempt for the “many humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling 
all over these prisons, looking for human-rights violations, while our troops, our heroes, are 
fighting and dying.”  Id.  See also Frank Rich, Saving Private England, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2004, at B1 (quoting Rush Limbaugh: “The photos of the abuses at Abu Ghraib ‘look like 
standard good old American pornography . . . .’”). 
 222. Charles Babington, Lawmakers Are Stunned By New Images of Abuse, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 2004, at B8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A22464-2004May12.html. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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Because of the shame, about 475 prisoners were released from Abu 
Ghraib in May 2004.225  The pressure on Secretary Rumsfeld grew intensely 
following his statement about the actions not being torture, and several 
prominent senators and congressmen called for his resignation.  It is 
unlikely that the prison would have been shut down if the horrific nature of 
the abuses had not been publicized and if the international community had 
not engaged in shaming.226  Given the experience with the prison in Guan-
tanamo Bay, it is likely that the administration would have weathered the 
storm of complaints and cited national security interests.227  The methodol-
ogy adopted by the international media and nongovernmental organizations 
like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch was shaming.228  By 
showing the administration that the conduct of the troops was revolting to 
the international community, AI and Human Rights Watch conveyed the 
disutility of national security arguments.229  In addition, the harsh rhetoric 
and labeling were calculated to shame on the internal dimension.230  Given 
the importance of a reputation for respecting human rights if the United 
States is to have the moral authority to call other countries to task for their 
  
 225. Transcript of CNN American Morning, May 21, 2004, available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0405/21/ltm.03.html. 
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law can play . . . . The Guantanamo litigants prevailed not because of the strength 
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Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A3; Elizabeth A. Lewis, Book Review, 48 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 293 (2007) (reviewing MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT (2005)) (“The press and the international public exerted consid-
erable pressure on the administration after the Abu Ghraib scandal[.]”). 
 230. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, USA: Pattern of Brutality and Cruelty—War 
Crimes at Abu Ghraib (May 7, 2004), available at http://www.news.am-
nesty.org/index/ENGAMR510772004. 
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poor records on that front, it became imperative for the administration to 
act.231  This call to moral authority and the sense of internalization of the 
norm was highlighted by Human Rights Watch in its report in 2005.  It 
wrote that  
The U.S. government’s use of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq poses a different 
kind of challenge: not because the scale of the abuse is as large as Darfur, but be-
cause the abuser is so powerful. . . .  That unlawful conduct has also undermined 
Washington’s much-needed credibility as a proponent of human rights and a leader 
of the campaign against terrorism. . . .  Washington’s weakened moral authority is 
felt acutely.232   
The danger of the norm being displaced because of the United States’ ac-
tions is a matter of serious shame for a state that has championed the 
norm.233  There is some evidence, according to some writers, that norm ero-
sion has occurred as more states adopt imitative strategies of their own, ap-
ing the actions of the violator.234 
The perceived loss of reputation abroad roused domestic public opin-
ion in the United States and gave rise to embarrassment and shame.235  This 
shame, at the individual citizen level, in turn must have moved up the ladder 
to the political leadership.236  It was pointed out by several observers that the 
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abuses would have the effect of mobilizing the enemy.237  They had the ef-
fect of undermining the moral basis for the invasion of Iraq and grievously 
hurt the claim that the United States was a force for good.238  It had the po-
tential to erode the American case for human rights and good governance in 
several parts of the world, thus undoing the efforts of several decades of 
foreign policy.239  This is clearly an example of shaming working effectively 
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in international law.240  The campaign was primarily directed at bringing 
disrepute to the United States.  Many of the campaigners had nothing to 
gain by bringing the individual perpetrators to justice—if they did, perhaps 
a complaint to the relevant authorities would have sufficed.  The campaign 
had all the attributes of shaming and was aimed at “expos[ing] the offender 
to public view and heap[ing] ignominy upon him . . . .”241  Serious reputa-
tional damage was indeed suffered by the United States as a result of these 
campaigns.242  Scholars have written about the effect that the revelations had 
in the Muslim world.243  Some have even analogized the atrocities to the 
Mai Lai incident in Vietnam.244 
The administration is unlikely to have reacted in the manner that it did 
but for shame.  Given its repeated claim that those detained in places like 
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib were not prisoners of war, and that the 
interrogation methods did not amount to torture, there was no legal re-
quirement that was breached by the United States.245  Even if it were possi-
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ble to make an argument about the customary international law norm 
against torture, it can be rebutted because torture is quite common, suggest-
ing that states do not abstain from torture out of any sense of legal obliga-
tion.246  A plausible legal argument could have been advanced by the ad-
ministration to justify its case that the abuses were isolated and did not 
amount to torture.  Further, history shows that even the flimsiest technical 
argument has been clutched at previously in the name of national security.  
Both support the conclusion that shame did work here.247  Indeed, there were 
attempts to cloud the United States’s obligations under the Geneva Conven-
tions to undermine criticism.248  Despite these attempts, shame proved more 
durable than legal technicalities in the face of an internalized norm against 
torture. 
The horizontal accessibility to publishing techniques makes shaming 
work very efficiently.  Whether the major news media would have given as 
much attention to the Abu Ghraib scandal as it did but for the noise gener-
ated by the NGO and blogging communities is open to debate.249  The avail-
ability of publishing techniques allowed secondary shaming to work, and 
imposed costs on free-riders. 
V.  ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS AS THE MISSING LINK IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that shaming can be a powerful 
phenomenon in international relations.  The central role played by the inter-
national media is also readily apparent.  Nongovernmental organizations 
and other actors with limited resources rely enormously on the media to 
publicize their lists of shame and reports identifying violations.  Without 
this publicity, it is certain that these reports and lists can have little, if any, 
effect.  To be sure, the sheer scale of public awareness that the popular me-
dia can achieve is hard to duplicate without significant cost.  While email 
newsletters and websites of international NGOs can carry the burden of 
dissemination to some extent, they pale in significance to the impact 
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achieved when the popular media highlights the same reports and lists.  The 
likely audience is also very different—email newsletters and websites of 
international NGOs are, in most instances, preaching to the choir.  The me-
dia reaches sections that may be unaware of the work done by the particular 
international NGO, and in many instances lends a certain authority to the 
report by its publication.  This is certainly related to the underlying credibil-
ity and reputation for integrity that the media outlet possesses.  For exam-
ple, The Sun is less likely to lend much authority to an Amnesty report than 
The Guardian, although the former might reach a wider audience.  Therein 
hides at least one problem: The Sun is more likely to highlight an Amnesty 
report that details human rights abuses in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, 
than one which provides evidence of torture in Myanmar.  This problem is 
not unique to publications like The Sun.  It is likely to exist, albeit to a lesser 
degree, even in responsible publications like The Guardian.  After all, no 
newspaper or magazine is immune from limitations of space, resources, and 
reader-interest, and only so many stories can be published.  What is the ef-
fect of all this on shaming as a sanction in international law?  One con-
spicuous effect is the inconsistent application of the sanction without regard 
to the certainty or degree of guilt, or the kinds of conduct alleged to be of-
fenses.250  The United States is probably more likely to be the target of a 
shame sanction than Myanmar for the exact same international law viola-
tion.  This obviously violates basic notions of fairness, and a ready solution 
does not suggest itself.   
One possibility would be for an agency like the United Nations to ad-
dress this problem by becoming more of a participant in the shaming proc-
ess.  Instead of passing resolutions that are largely toothless and unknown to 
most people, it could require the offending government to bear the cost of 
publishing either the resolution that shames that country, or a summary 
thereof, in the major newspapers in the offending country.  Another possi-
bility would be for the U.N. itself to bear this cost, if the offending govern-
ment does not, and to place advertisements in the major newspapers of the 
offending country to publicize the shameful conduct of the government.  
This can only work in democratic societies with a free press.  An advertise-
ment by the U.N. is unlikely to be possible when the offender is a dictator-
ship where the press is under the control of the dictator.  Even if it is possi-
ble to place an advertisement at the expense of the U.N., the absence of a 
meaningful opposition will militate against the effectiveness of the adver-
tisement.  The suggestion for requiring the offending government to bear 
the cost or in the alternative for the U.N. to do so, in the offender’s media is 
deliberate.  This leaves international public opinion untouched.  The costs 
  
 250. Massaro, Legal Reform, supra note 83, at 691-99 (arguing that shaming sanc-
tions’ effects are inconsistent). 
834 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2007:785 
involved with placing advertisements outside the offender’s news media 
would be enormous. 
There is also the problem of identifying the relevant media in which to 
advertise.  It is unlikely that an advertisement in a newspaper in Myanmar 
would be as effective as an advertisement in the New York Times.  Yet, 
choosing the New York Times for the advertisement would expose the U.N. 
to familiar allegations of first-world bias.  Making the U.N. pay for the ad-
vertisements is problematic from other angles, too: it will have the effect of 
overloading the market with shame sanctions to the point where their utility 
will decrease enormously.251  It will do this because the transfer of the cost 
of shaming removes one check—that only those actions which deserve to be 
shamed will see the expenditure of significant and scarce resources, and that 
minor transgressions will be weeded out because the enforcers can only do 
so much.  Instead, if parties wishing to enforce shame sanctions have the 
possibility of someone else bearing the burden, what would stop every 
transgression from being the subject of shaming?  On the other hand, the 
free availability of resources has the effect of leveling the field for smaller 
players and prevents the kinds of biases caused by monopoly power.252  A 
small NGO in Myanmar may have the same ability to shame that AI has.  
This would serve to minimize frequent complaints that organizations like 
Amnesty are mouthpieces for Western governments and only target third-
world nations.  However, despite these shortcomings, if shame sanctions 
have to be meaningful, those enforcing the sanction must bear the burdens 
associated with their imposition, and for want of a better alternative, the 
present situation is likely to be all that is feasible.  This burden has fallen 
considerably because of the Internet, and it does not cost very much for 
NGOs even in poor countries to shame their governments.  While they may 
not be immediately as effective as Amnesty, it must be remembered that 
Amnesty was not created in a day. 
The lowering of costs and the proliferation of shaming utilizing the 
Internet has consequences on the impact of the shaming that must be ad-
dressed by the international legal system if shaming is to continue to be 
effective.  One possibility is to differentiate shaming that follows after the 
imposition of a legal sanction by an official agency or tribunal, and to make 
the shame sanction an integral part of that legal sanction.  Thus, for exam-
ple, when the European Court of Human Rights determined that Russia was 
liable for various human rights violations in Chechnya, it could have im-
posed a shame sanction as a complement to the legal sanction—the damages 
  
 251. See Massaro, American Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1930 (“[I]f the penalty 
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 252. See Posting of Alex Engwete to Afrikblog to http://alexengwete.afrikblog.com/- 
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award.253  This could be in the form of a prominently published apology, at 
the expense of the Russian government, in the Russian, Chechen, and inter-
national media; the publication, at the expense of the Russian government, 
of particular parts of the judgment of the court holding the government li-
able; and the publication, again at the government’s expense, of the names 
of the individuals who were found to have perpetrated the atrocities.  These 
are likely to be much more effective than the “moral damages” of $35,000 
imposed in one case where a Chechen had disappeared.  Thirty-five thou-
sand dollars, or indeed most amounts of money damages, are likely to be 
rather insignificant for many sovereign states.  This argument is not new: it 
has been made in the criminal law in the context of fines.254  Besides, there 
is the problem that money damages paid by the state only serve to punish 
the innocent taxpayer rather than those who committed the offenses.  This 
appears to be doubly cruel when a dictator rules the state—the poorer citi-
zens have to bear both the burden of his or her rule, and have the common 
weal eroded due to atrocities committed by him or her.  There is also the 
objection that imposition of money penalties does not express the interna-
tional community’s sense of outrage and condemnation at the conduct found 
to be violative of international law.255  This expressive dimension of interna-
tional law has not been addressed sufficiently in the literature and is the 
subject of another paper.  
The differentiation of shame sanctions based on their following the 
imposition of a legal sanction is by no means a perfect solution.  This is on 
account of it being applicable only in a small number of cases, due to the 
absence of a centralized international court system, and because there can 
be inconsistencies in application depending on the familiarity and appetite 
for shame sanctions of the tribunal; however, these objections can be ad-
dressed.  Given the absence of a world court with universal jurisdiction, 
restricting the imposition of shame sanctions to legal sanctions issued by 
courts would be too narrow to be of much use.  Then, the place of the court 
could be taken by an organization of universal participation like the U.N., 
with the result that a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security 
Council could take the place of the sanction issued by a court, if the resolu-
tion makes a finding pertaining to the commission of an offense.  Since the 
U.N. frequently appoints commissions of experts to conduct investigations 
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in the kinds of cases that are discussed in the preceding pages, the objection 
that resolutions passed by the U.N. are without factual basis is unlikely to be 
true in all cases.  Resolutions frequently reference the findings of these 
commissions of inquiry, and while one can make political arguments about 
the decision-making process itself, no institution known to man is immune 
from challenges about interest-group capture, time and resource constraints, 
populism, etc.  Thus, they need not detain us unduly.  As long as the U.N. 
consistently imposes the shame sanction upon every determination of fault, 
it would be an improvement.  However, given the difficulty in arriving at 
agreement in the U.N. on anything even remotely controversial, one must 
temper optimism about the possibility of attaching shame sanctions as a 
complement or supplement to U.N. resolutions. 
There are reasons for hope that shaming can fill an important vacuum 
in international law, and these are owed more to the work of international 
NGOs than to states and international institutions.  The successful campaign 
against landmines,256 and the movement to ban cluster bombs257 and uranium 
bullets,258 all exemplify the deployment of shame by non-state actors as the 
source of constraint on state action.  Although its success as a piece of in-
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ternational law is open to question because of the lack of ratification by 
countries like the United States,259 Russia, and China, it cannot be denied 
that getting 153 countries to ratify the landmine ban treaty (in just ten years) 
is no insignificant achievement.260  Shame has worked in tangible ways even 
for holdouts like the United States: it placed a moratorium on “dumb 
mines”261 and destroyed millions of them following the naming and shaming 
campaigns.262  Publications like the Ban Treaty News and Campaign against 
DU News, and coalitions of interest-based groups like the Cluster Munition 
Coalition,263 have served to show the strategic importance of grassroots ac-
tivism to advance the reach of international law.  These coalitions are acting 
in ways that mimic international institutions, as exemplified by the Oslo 
Conference on Cluster Munitions that took place in Vienna in February 
2007.264  
Another distinctive feature of international law shaming in contrast to 
shaming in criminal law is that the offenses targeted in the former are rela-
tively major transgressions.  In the criminal law, shaming is most frequently 
employed in the context of relatively minor offenses—such as traffic of-
fenses—where the fine or punishment is itself not deterrent enough.  In in-
ternational law, the offenses that we have discussed—genocide, nuclear 
testing, and torture—are major transgressions.  This might suggest that the 
cost-benefit analysis is more favorable for shaming as an acceptable sanc-
tion in international law. 
This eruption of activity, and the ready resort to shaming, must not 
make us blind to the seriously troubling aspects about its use that made us 
jettison shaming in the criminal law as societies moved toward more civi-
  
 259. Wexler points out that although the United States has not ratified the treaty, it 
has been impelled by shame to adopt several “second-best” responses.  Wexler, supra note 
39, at 598-600.  Such second-best responses include providing $80,000,000 in demining 
funding.  Id. at 600.  “The United States responded to shaming and internalized the norm 
against landmines by: (1) increased domestic funding for global demining efforts; (2) promo-
tion of international landmine regulations; (3) adherence to a unilateral moratorium on land-
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153rd country to ratify the Landmine Ban Treaty.  Id. 
 261. “Dumb mines” are mines that do not self-destruct after a period of time and are 
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 262. See U.S. Dep’t of State, State Department Chronology on Humanitarian Land-
mine Action (July 14, 2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news- 
/2003/07/mil-030714-usia02.htm.   
 263. Cluster Munition Coalition, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008).  The CMC is an international network of over 200 civil society organizations 
in fifty countries.   
 264. The conference is expected to see the attendance of over fifty nongovernmental 
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lized ways of dealing with offenders.  Firstly, reputations are very hard to 
build and much easier to tarnish.  Once destroyed, an innocent actor’s repu-
tation might not be easily repaired.  To embark on a path of ready resort to 
shaming penalties in international law, without any processual checks to 
ensure that the alleged offender is really guilty, would be a grave mistake.  
Unlike in the criminal law, the default position in international law is not 
imprisonment, but inaction or ineffective action.  While one might argue, 
perhaps disingenuously, that the loss of reputation is preferable to the loss 
of liberty when one is imprisoned, in order to apply the analogy to interna-
tional law, it should be possible to persuasively contend that the loss of 
reputation (when one is innocent) is preferable to inaction or ineffective 
action.  That, then, is the nub of the case.  In the example provided in the 
preceding pages, what would be the risk that an improper use of shaming 
would yield?  Arguably, that the United States was not responsible for the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, but that it would still be subject to shame and embar-
rassment because of the imposition of the sanction.  On the other hand, what 
would be the consequence of inaction or ineffective actions?  That people 
would continue to be tortured with impunity by states, and offenders would 
go free.  When viewed in this light, the moral objections that one finds dif-
ficult to overcome in the criminal law may not operate as powerfully in in-
ternational law. 
The account offered in the preceding pages is not meant to suggest, by 
any means, that shaming offers a perfect solution to the critiques about the 
lack of constraining power in international law.  The account offered is es-
sentially limited to an argument that shaming offers relatively high yields 
when compared with any of the other feasible options, and that it ought to 
fill the enforcement gap in international law.  The near impossibility of cre-
ating a world court with universal jurisdiction in the foreseeable future 
means that discussions about the sanctioning or constraining power of inter-
national law in the traditional sense that constraining power is understood, 
i.e., via a court that punishes for breaches of the law, is only in the realm of 
fantasy.  Even if such a court could be established, it is by no means certain 
that its judgments could be enforced without the need for other sanctioning 
mechanisms like shame.  The costs imposed by such litigation are also 
likely to be enormous and unbearable by many of the parties most likely to 
need international law.  Because a world court is unlikely to ever be given 
the power to incarcerate the head of a state or government, even after bear-
ing all the costs of litigation before it, the successful party is probably only 
in a position of using the judgment to embarrass or shame the offender.  In 
rare cases, money damages may be available.  Shaming offers the prospect 
of similar results at much lower costs, within a much shorter time frame.  
The proliferation of non-state actors means that the enforcers of shaming 
possess more resources, at least in terms of the human element, than a world 
court is likely to possess.  Given that reality, shaming offers quicker results 
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in comparison with a long wait for court time.  If the experience with the 
backlogs at the European Court of Human Rights is any indicator, the 
speedy resolution of disputes is a hortative hope at best and a fiction at 
worst.  When viewed thus, shaming is not the panacea for all the problems 
that ail international law, but merely a better alternative to other more fanci-
ful options, with the added virtue that it can achieve results at a lower cost, 
and without the democratic deficit that is hard to avoid in international insti-
tutions.  Besides, and perhaps more importantly, the purpose of shaming 
comports very well with a major objective of international law—to con-
strain, rather than to punish. 
